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73 
Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall 
Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the 
Dodd-Frank Act 
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp  
I. INTRODUCTION 
A decade ago, when the collapse of Enron1 and scandals at Tyco2 
and WorldCom3 shook Wall Street, Congress reacted by enacting the 
now much-maligned4 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).5 Among SOX’s 
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Law. A.B. (Economics), Harvard College (1998); J.D., Yale Law School (2001). The Author 
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Fredrik Persson (Toledo Law, 2013) provided capable research assistance for this project. The 
University of Toledo College of Law summer research grant program supported this Article. 
The Author also thanks Lois Patek for her tireless administrative assistance.  
 1. Manish Gupta, Elan, Enron and the Aftermath of Scandal: A Comparative Analysis 
of Recent Irish and American Corporate Governance Legislation, 39 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1, 18 
(2008) (“Perhaps the best known bankruptcy, though not the largest, involved Houston-based 
energy trader Enron Corporation. Enron hid assets and liabilities in over 2000 business 
entities, many of which were wholly-owned special purpose entities that were not included on 
Enron’s financial statements.”). 
 2. Joan T.A. Gabel et al., Evolving Regulation of Corporate Governance and the 
Implications for D&O Liability: The United States and Australia, 11 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
365, 371 (2010) (“Tyco, a maker of equipment for various industries (including electrical, fire 
and security, healthcare and telecommunications), became embroiled in a similar scandal 
involving financial misstatements and a blatant misuse of corporate funds.”). 
 3. Christian A. Young, Note, Looking Back on WorldCom: Addressing Underwriters’ 
Due Diligence in Shelf Registration Offerings and the Need for Reform, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
521, 536 (2007) (explaining that WorldCom’s tale “involve[d] a large scale accounting scandal 
resulting in the financial collapse, and subsequent bankruptcy filing, of WorldCom, Inc”). 
 4. SOX has generated much controversy and been criticized as costly for small 
businesses and foreign companies and blamed “in part for reduced foreign listings on the New 
York Stock Exchange.” Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. 
REV. 1757, 1758–59 (2007). 
 5. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor 
Protection Act), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of U.S.C. titles 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29). In the aftermath of various corporate 
scandals, “[t]he bill raced through Congress,” Gabel et al., supra note 2, at 375, passing by a 
vote of 99-0 in the Senate. Beverley H. Earle & Gerald A. Madek, The Mirage of Whistleblower 
Protection Under Sarbanes-Oxley: A Proposal for Change, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 4 (2007). The 
“unusual rapidity of this vote, in a body no longer known for its civility, signaled that perhaps 
Congress had not carefully considered all the provisions.” Id. For a scathing critique of the 
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more prominent features was the first federal enactment providing 
whistleblower protection for insiders with knowledge of financial 
fraud.6 SOX criminalized retaliation against whistleblowers,7 creating 
a new administrative remedy for aggrieved tipsters under the auspices 
of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).8  
Ten years later, when the collapse of America’s shadow-banking 
system9 led Wall Street to receive an unprecedented federal bailout, 
Congress once again10 reacted with a legislative hydra,11 the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank).12 As before, whistleblowers took center stage. In Dodd-
Frank, however, whistleblowers not only receive protection from 
termination or adverse employment action but can also lay claim to 
financial bounties for bringing information to the Securities and  
 
 
 
merits and process of adoption of SOX, see Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 
Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005) (arguing that the 
policies included in SOX “may . . . be characterized as recycled ideas advocated for quite some 
time by corporate governance entrepreneurs”). 
 6. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (West 2010). 
 7. Id. § 1513(e). 
 8. OSHA’s designation as the investigating agency has struck a number of observers as 
odd. Prior to SOX, OSHA “had no experience . . . with such problems.” Earle & Madek, 
supra note 5, at 3. To be sure, OSHA “already administer[ed] some whistleblower statutes,” 
but those statutes often involve “more concrete and less vague” protected activity than 
blowing the whistle “with respect to violations of accounting principles.” Id. at 15. The 
investigation of “securities-related irregularities” is “presumably outside of OSHA’s usual 
arena.” Id. 
 9. Christopher T. Hines, Returning to First Principles of Privilege Law: Focusing on the 
Facts in Internal Corporate Investigations, 60 KAN. L. Rev. 101, 105 (2011) (“As we now 
know, a credit bubble of historic proportions, which initially formed in the housing markets 
through excessive subprime lending, eventually infected the overall financial markets through a 
complex web of transactions linking financial institutions both in the United States and 
abroad.”). 
 10. “It seems that with every new corporate or financial crisis/scandal/failure, we end 
up discussing many of the same issues and concerns as with prior ones.” M. Thomas Arnold, 
“It’s Déjà Vu All Over Again”: Using Bounty Hunters to Leverage Gatekeeper Duties, 45 TULSA 
L. REV. 419, 438 (2010). 
 11. The Act was the “most comprehensive financial reform legislation since the 1930s.” 
BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41350, THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM 
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: ISSUES AND SUMMARY (2010), available at 
http://www.llsdc.org/attachments/files/232/CRS-R41350.pdf. 
 12. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1367 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. titles 7, 12, 15, and 
31) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. 
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Exchange Commission (SEC) that leads to successful securities 
enforcement actions.13 
With the recent release of the SEC’s final rule 21F14 to govern 
the application of Dodd-Frank § 922,15 which embraces 
whistleblower bounties for securities fraud tipsters,16 it is appropriate 
to reflect on the nature and meaning of this provision. Law 
professors had called for whistleblower bounties for financial fraud 
tipsters in the decade that followed the enactment of SOX. Pamela 
Bucy’s 2002 article, Private Justice,17 made the case for private 
litigation of securities fraud disputes, as well as citizen environmental 
suits.18  
I argued in 2007 in Beyond Protection19 that the SOX 
framework—which provides security against retaliation but little 
positive incentive to encourage whistleblowing—was inadequate 
motivation for those with access to information about serious 
corporate fraud. I argued that payments could be made out of the 
“Fair Funds” collected by the SEC to provide restitution for injured 
investors.20 In a follow-up piece in 2009, False Claims, Not Securities 
Fraud,21 I criticized the lukewarm embrace of whistleblower 
bounties in the Obama Administration’s Investor Protection Act, 
which became the precursor of Dodd-Frank. Unfortunately, the 
initial proposed language left a high degree of discretion in the hands 
 
 13. Id. § 922, 15 U.S.C.S. § 78u-6 (Lexis Supp. 2011) (amending § 21F of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 14. The SEC was originally set to release the final rules by April 21, but the 
Commission announced in April that it would miss that deadline. Joe Palazzolo, SEC Will Miss 
Deadline for Whistleblower Rules, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Apr. 21, 2011, 5:35 PM), 
http://tinyurl.com/7et94cd (subscription required). The final rules were adopted by the 
Commission in a May 25, 2011, vote. Those rules took effect August 12. See Securities 
Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300 (June 13, 2011) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 and 249) [hereinafter SEC Final Rules]. 
 15. Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 15 U.S.C.S. § 78u-6. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 44, 105 (2002). 
 18. Id. at 128. 
 19. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for 
Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 92 (2007). 
 20. Id. at 147–50. This aspect of the proposal was called “interesting” given the 
“amount of money that the fair funds provision of Sarbanes-Oxley is generating,” in the 
neighborhood of $2 billion in just 2009. Arnold, supra note 10, at 467 nn.417–18 (footnote 
omitted). 
 21. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, False Claims, Not Securities Fraud: Towards Corporate 
Governance by Whistleblowers, 15 NEXUS 55 (2010). 
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of the SEC. Historically, the Commission had rarely exercised its 
discretion to pay tipsters in the insider trading context, where 
bounties had long been authorized.22 In a paper written before the 
enactment of Dodd-Frank, Tomas Arnold argued for a mandatory 
whistleblower bounty scheme for financial fraud tipsters providing 
original information that was a “substantial factor” in leading to a 
corporate restatement of earnings.23 
Dodd-Frank’s new whistleblower provision represents a victory 
for those who had called for whistleblower bounties in the securities 
fraud context. Unfortunately, Dodd-Frank’s embrace of this policy 
proposal may prove to be, like SOX before it, a missed opportunity. 
Although Dodd-Frank drew some of its inspiration from the False 
Claims Act (FCA)24—the “gold-standard”25 of whistleblower 
protection and bounty rewards—it fell short in one critical respect. 
While whistleblowers were provided with a process for seeking 
rewards, Dodd-Frank failed to embrace the crucial qui tam26 
 
 22. See infra notes 430–40 and accompanying text. 
 23. See Arnold, supra note 10, at 464. Professor Arnold’s proposal had the following 
core components: (1) bounties would only be available where existing bounty schemes did not 
apply; (2) bounties would only be paid where the informant provided a written disclosure to a 
firm’s audit committee; (3) government or corporate employees tasked with internal 
investigations would be barred from claiming bounties; (4) bounties would be “generous 
enough to incentivize” a person to blow the whistle; (5) the proposal would “provide for 
mandatory and not discretionary payment of bounties”; and (6) bounties would only be paid 
“if the original information disclosed is a substantial factor leading to a restatement of the 
company’s financial statements.” Id. Most distinctively when compared to Dodd-Frank, 
however, Arnold’s proposal would vest discretion to identify the amount of the award in a 
firm’s own audit committee, rather than the SEC. See id. at 464–65. 
 24. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006). For example, the statute’s “voluntary disclosure” 
and “original information” components, 15 U.S.C.S. § 78u-6(a)(3) (Lexis Supp. 2011), draw 
on the FCA’s “original source” requirement, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). Similarly, the upper 
limit for bounty awards, thirty percent mirrors that of the FCA. Id. § 3730(d). However, the 
statute’s more immediate model was the IRS whistleblower program. See MARK JICKLING, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41503, THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND 
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: TITLE IX, INVESTOR PROTECTION 3 (2010) (“The program is 
modeled on the Internal Revenue Service Whistleblower program.”). 
 25. While at least one scholar characterized SOX as the “gold standard” of 
whistleblower protection, see Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era 
of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 376 (2005), most research on the statute would 
dispute that characterization. Instead, it is the FCA that is “the most vibrant and dominant of 
all qui tam actions available in the United States today.” Elizabeth I. Winston, The Flawed 
Nature of the False Marking Statute, 77 TENN. L. REV. 111, 140 (2009). 
 26. The phrase “qui tam” is a short-hand for the Latin qui tam pro domino rege quam 
pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, or “who pursues this action on our Lord the King’s behalf as 
well as his own.” Vt. Agency of Natural Res. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1 (2000) 
(citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *160). 
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provisions of the FCA that allow whistleblowers to litigate cases 
independently from federal action. Perhaps because of the power of 
the Wall Street lobby,27 which regularly puts the “Military-Industrial 
Complex” to shame,28 whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank will remain 
spectators in most stages of the enforcement actions triggered by 
their revelations. 
This Article addresses the new whistleblower provisions along 
three dimensions. First, does Dodd-Frank embrace the ideal version 
of whistleblower bounties? Second, to what extent can the new 
statute be expected to change behavior in corporate America and 
alter the securities enforcement landscape? Finally, in considering 
alternatives to Dodd-Frank’s approach, what does the FCA reveal 
about the failings of the new law?29  
This project is a timely one, as the increased statutory protection 
under SOX has led to a flurry of post-2002 research on the behavior 
of whistleblowers. Both from the perspective of empirical economics 
and behavioral psychology, researchers have gleaned new 
understandings of the motivations of whistleblowers and the 
effectiveness of bounties in spurring reporting and aiding the 
detection of fraud. This Article takes up these new sources to provide 
perspective on Dodd-Frank. For instance, a detailed 2010 
econometric study by Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse, and Luigi 
Zingales30 (the “Dyck Study”), provides support for the notion that 
 
 27. andré douglas pond cummings, Procuring “Justice”? Citizens United, Caperton, and 
Partisan Judicial Elections, 95 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 89, 107 (2010) (“Wall Street leadership 
chose to use millions of dollars of TARP funds, provided by U.S. taxpayers, to pay lobbyists to 
fiercely lobby against new financial services regulations Congress was considering in light of the 
reckless behavior of those same executives.”). 
 28. President Eisenhower warned of the “acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether 
sought or unsought, of the military-industrial complex.” Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell 
Radio and Television Address to the American People, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 
OF THE UNITED STATES, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 1035, 1038 (1961). 
 29. In fact, whistleblowers wary of the obstacles to getting paid under the Dodd-Frank 
law may choose to pursue their claims using the more powerful FCA, at least to the extent that 
they work for companies that have yet to pay back federal bailout funds and so remain partially 
owned by the federal government. See generally, Ben Maiden, Firms Face Private Suits over 
Bailout, COMPLIANCE REP., April 27, 2009, at 1, 11, available at 
http://www.compliancereporter.com/pdf/CR042709.pdf (“‘Someone will come up with a 
theory that if you violate one of the post-hoc [TARP] conditions that you are violating the 
FCA,’ said defense attorney John Boese, of counsel with Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & 
Jacobson.” (alteration in original)); Rapp, supra note 21 (arguing that the FCA empowers 
whistleblowers to pursue bounties in stock fraud cases involving companies receiving federal 
bailout funds). 
 30. See Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 
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“the role of monetary incentives [for whistleblowers] should be 
expanded.”31 Similarly, a 2010 study by Robert Bowen, Andrew 
Call, and Shiva Rajgopal found that, contrary to what some in the 
corporate lobby might fear, whistleblowing is rarely “frivolous, 
misleading, or unreliable.”32 Instead, whistleblowing allegations tend 
to uncover previously existing “unknown agency problems” at target 
firms and identify genuine instances of financial misconduct.33 
This Article represents the third stage of my project on 
whistleblower bounties.34 With the benefit of the newly enacted 
statute, the policy proposals developed in earlier pieces can be 
compared to the new law and to likely claims under its provisions. 
Section 922 was erroneously trumpeted in some circles as providing 
“qui tam” provisions;35 in fact, its biggest failure may be that it does 
not create true qui tam structures. That is, the law facilitates 
payments to whistleblowers, but provides no avenue for 
whistleblowers to pursue securities fraud actions directly. Instead, 
payments are only available in instances in which the SEC recovers 
civil fines.  
This Article builds on my earlier work by probing the differences 
between a bounty scheme which simply makes rewards available and 
one which gives whistleblowers the opportunity to pursue litigation 
themselves. To the extent that whistleblowers are motivated by 
concerns other than money—as indicated by recent experimental 
studies using a behavioral psychology approach—the qui tam model 
offers more hope for stimulating whistleblowing than the reward-
only option selected by Dodd-Frank. Qui tam gives whistleblowers a 
chance to tell their stories and to restore their reputations, and gives 
“voice” to the reality of their experiences. 
Other limitations of the new statute include its restriction to 
cases in which the monetary sanctions imposed total more than $1 
 
2213 (2010). 
 31. Id. at 2251. 
 32. See Robert M. Bowen et al., Whistle-Blowing: Target Firm Characteristics and 
Economic Consequences, 85 ACCT. REV. 1239, 1242 (2010). 
 33. Id. at 1241. 
 34.  In the first stage of the project, see Rapp, supra note 19, I argued for bounty 
rewards for securities fraud whistleblowers. In the second stage, see Rapp, supra note 21, I 
evaluated the proposed bounty scheme in the Obama administration’s draft investor protection 
statute.  
 35. See Richard Renner, CNBC Notices Whistleblower Provisions of Dodd-Frank Act, 
WHISTLEBLOWERS PROTECTION BLOG (July 27, 2010), http://tinyurl.com/7y2n2ky. 
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million.36 Moreover, the Act grants the SEC broad discretion 
regarding the amount of an award. While the statute makes awards 
mandatory once its many threshold criteria are met,37 the 
Commission is granted discretion to decide the level of award (from 
ten to thirty percent of the funds generated by an enforcement 
action).38 In current FCA practice, whistleblowers may argue their 
proposed share in court; it is not clear what kind of presentation, if 
any, the Commission will entertain from whistleblowers seeking 
bounties under the new statute. 
Dodd-Frank was not, by any means, a complete failure. Its most 
important achievement is that, in contrast to the Administration’s 
proposed Investor Protection Act of 2009,39 it provides for judicial 
review of SEC decisions not to pay bounties. Dodd-Frank allows a 
decision not to pay a bounty to be appealed by whistleblowers to an 
appropriate United States Court of Appeals. Given the deference 
afforded administrative agencies,40 it is doubtful that a large share of 
no-award decisions will be second-guessed, but the avenue is at least 
available for potential claimants. 
Only time will tell whether the new whistleblower provisions 
provide the kind of fix for Wall Street’s corruption or ineptitude that 
SOX apparently failed to produce. However, based on the failures of 
the new statute to embrace true qui tam structures, the most likely 
prognosis is grim. This Article advances the case for an Informer’s 
Act for Dodd-Frank whistleblowers, a variant of a traditional qui tam 
action that could supplement the new law and help it fulfill its 
promise. Part II of this Article discusses the background for Dodd-
Frank and the legislative and rulemaking history of the new 
whistleblower provision. Part III discusses the drivers of securities 
fraud and how whistleblower policy might impact detection and 
 
 36. Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 15 U.S.C.S. § 78u-6 (Lexis Supp. 2011) (amending § 21F 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 37. Id. § 922(F)(b)(1). 
 38. Id. 
 39.  Investor Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 3817, 111th Cong. § 922 (2009) (proposing 
to amend the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 by inserting section 21F), available at 
http://www.llsdc.org/attachments/files/265/Adm-bill-T09-A.pdf. 
 40. An agency’s interpretation will be accepted unless the statute at issue forbids that 
interpretation, or the interpretation, for other reasons, “exceeds the bounds of the 
permissible.” Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218 (2002) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). Once the agency has 
promulgated rules, its own interpretation of those rules will be similarly entitled to deference. 
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457–58 (1997). 
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deterrence. Part IV explores the literature on whistleblowing in an 
effort to capture the effect of the new statute on motivating financial 
fraud tipsters to come forward. Part V compares the new law to the 
federal FCA and other precedents to gain insight into the likely 
ramifications of the new provision. Part VI lays out suggested 
improvements to help the new law fulfill its promise.  
II. DODD-FRANK BECOMES LAW 
A. Pre-SOX Whistleblower Protection 
In the bad old days before SOX provided its whistleblower 
protection, would-be tipsters were left unprotected by federal law 
from retaliation for revealing information about corporate and 
financial fraud. A patchwork of state laws41 and common law 
wrongful termination claims provided the best hope for a terminated 
employee seeking to recover damages. Potential whistleblowers 
typically had to rely on the “‘vagaries’ of state law for protection.”42 
Such protection was sporadic, if present at all,43 and the treatment of 
whistleblowers was haphazard.44 State whistleblowing laws were 
“murky, piecemeal, disorganized,” and highly variable “from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.”45 
Many of these state laws limited protection for whistleblowers 
based on the party to whom the whistleblower reported 
wrongdoing.46 A majority of states only protected whistleblowers  
 
 
 41. Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness 
of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 
1161 (2010) (“Antiretaliation protections have developed as a patchwork of state and federal 
statutory and common law exceptions to the employment-at-will regime, a century-old default 
rule that has allowed employers to terminate their employees ‘for good cause, for no cause, or 
even for morally wrong cause.’”). 
 42. Valerie Watnick, Whistleblower Protections Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Primer 
and Critique, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 831, 842 (2007) (citation omitted). 
 43. Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why 
Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 68–69 (2007). 
 44. Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the 
Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029, 1042 
(2004). 
 45. Id. at 1049. 
 46. Gerard Sinzdak, An Analysis of Current Whistleblower Laws: Defending a More 
Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1633, 1633 (2008).  
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who filed reports with governmental entities.47 The majority did not 
protect individuals who reported their suspicions within the firm.48  
State statutes also varied in terms of whether they protected only 
whistleblowers who revealed actual violations of the law or also those 
who were mistaken but had a reasonable belief that such a violation 
occurred.49 Some state statutes applied only to public health and 
safety violations, while others protected employees who reported any 
sort of legal violation.50 Some state statutes also limited protection to 
only public sector employees.51 
In discussing SOX prior to its adoption, one senator noted that 
corporate employers knew exactly what to do within state law to 
avoid a suit by a whistleblowing employee.52 Given the location of 
many financial services firms in New York, and the Empire State’s 
historically weak whistleblower protections,53 state law was 
particularly ineffective in protecting securities fraud whistleblowers. 
The difficulties confronting whistleblowers under state law in 
pursuing anti-retaliation claims “discouraged employees from 
consistently coming forward with information.”54 
Statutory protection for whistleblowers was supplemented, in 
some states, by the recognition of a common law tort claim for 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.55 As with statutory 
protections, the requirements for pursuing such common law claims 
varied “substantially from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.”56 Some 
scholarship has characterized courts’ recognition of common law 
wrongful termination claims based on whistleblowing as 
“frequent,”57 although there remains a significant degree of 
uncertainty “over the scope of such protections.”58 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 1634. 
 49. Id. at 1637. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Watnick, supra note 42, at 842 (citing 148 CONG. REC. S7418–21 (2002)). 
 53. New York law only protected whistleblowers reporting threats to public health. Id. 
at 858. 
 54. Moberly, supra note 43, at 76. 
 55. Sinzdak, supra note 46, at 1643. 
 56. Id. at 1643–44. 
 57. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 41, at 1162. 
 58. Id. 
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B. SOX—A Failed First Attempt to Foster Whistleblowing 
SOX provides both an anti-retaliation provision to protect 
whistleblowers and what Richard Moberly calls a “structural model” 
to encourage greater whistleblowing.59 SOX’s anti-retaliation 
provision creates a civil action for whistleblowers subject to adverse 
employment action by reporting companies,60 and also criminalizes 
such retaliation.61 The central idea of the anti-retaliation provision is 
“to motivate employees” to blow the whistle “by providing 
employees who make complaints with protection from employer 
retaliation in the workplace.”62 On its face, SOX “appears to provide 
strong substantive and procedural protections for whistleblowers.”63 
But in fact, its provisions “give[] the illusion of protection without 
truly meaningful opportunities or remedies for achieving it.”64 
Section 806 articulates whistleblower protections for individuals 
who cooperate with legal investigations and those who report 
misconduct to an internal firm supervisor.65 The whistleblower 
provisions only apply to individuals engaging in “protected activity,” 
defined broadly to include “reporting information to Congress, any 
investigative agency of the federal government, or a supervisor at the 
employer itself.”66 A whistleblower does not have to show an actual 
violation of federal law to gain protection, but is only required to 
show that she had a “reasonable belief” that a violation had 
occurred.67 A whistleblower has to file a complaint with the Secretary 
of Labor and can bring a federal lawsuit if no decision results within 
180 days.68 Whistleblowers have to show that they were subject to an 
 
 59. The structural model “requires that corporations provide employees with a 
standardized channel to report organizational misconduct internally within the corporation.” 
Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model to Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, 
2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1109. 
 60. See Arnold, supra note 10, at 460. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Jarod Spencer Gonzalez, A Pot of Gold at the End of the Rainbow: An Economic 
Incentives-Based Approach to OSHA Whistleblowing, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 325, 326 
(2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1538336. 
 63. Moberly, supra note 43, at 83. 
 64. Dworkin, supra note 4, at 1764. 
 65. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006). The option of bringing a claim in federal court is a 
“‘safety valve’ . . . designed to encourage the Department of Labor to process SOX 
whistleblower claims within the 180-day time frame.” Gonzalez, supra note 62, at 333. 
 66. Watnick, supra note 42, at 844. 
 67. Id. at 845. 
 68. Earle & Madek, supra note 5, at 5. 
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“unfavorable personnel action” and that their protected activity was 
a contributing factor.69 The “contributing factor” requirement, the 
statute’s causation element, has proven “the most significant and 
most difficult factor to prove in a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower 
case.”70 
Among the remedies available to successful claimants are orders 
of reinstatement, standard back pay, and special damages, “including 
attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, and expert witness fees.”71 
SOX’s protections have a number of holes, and its shield has 
been characterized as “narrow in scope and more illusory than 
real.”72 The statute is procedurally complex,73 and provides no 
punitive damages in civil actions by whistleblowers, meaning that a 
terminated whistleblower’s only likely victory would be an award of 
back pay and attorney’s fees.74 A short statute of limitations requires 
whistleblowers to file a complaint within ninety days after a violation 
occurrs.75 No jury trial right exists under the SOX provisions for 
those whistleblowers bringing claims in federal court.76 At the OSHA 
stage of a complaint, employers are permitted to make submissions 
to which a complaining employee has no right to respond.77 
Another problem is that the procedures established in SOX have 
not been “closely followed” by the governmental actors tasked with 
enforcing the anti-retaliation protections.78 Most cases linger for 
“longer than the mandated 180 days.”79 In past cases, both OSHA 
and Department of Labor Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) “rigidly 
construed” SOX’s legal requirements.80 OSHA also tends to 
“misapply Sarbanes-Oxley’s burden of proof for the few cases that 
survived the agency’s strict legal scrutiny.”81  
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Watnick, supra note 42, at 849. 
 71. Moberly, supra note 43, at 78. 
 72. Deborah L. Seifert et al., The Influence of Organizational Justice on Accountant 
Whistleblowing, 35 ACCT., ORGS. & SOC. 707, 709 (2010). 
 73. Dworkin, supra note 4, at 1765. 
 74. Earle & Madek, supra note 5, at 3. 
 75. Id. at 6. 
 76. Gonzalez, supra note 62, at 334. 
 77. Watnick, supra note 42, at 864. 
 78. Id. at 840. 
 79. Id. at 840–41. 
 80. Moberly, supra note 43, at 67, 71. 
 81. Id. at 72. 
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OSHA’s role as gatekeeper for SOX claims has struck observers 
as odd,82 and the agency has not proven an effective arbiter of 
whistleblower claims in either SOX or other contexts. The agency’s 
employees lack the “necessary training and equipment to do their 
jobs,” and despite mandatory training, the agency does not 
“ensure[] attendance” at such courses.83 In particular, SOX requires 
investigators to “understand complex securities and navigate 
complicated legal issues in order to conduct an investigation,” but 
OSHA has failed to develop any “specialized training on specific, 
complex” issues raised by the statute.84 Program enforcement varies 
across OSHA’s regional offices, and its national coordinator “lacks 
mechanisms, such as access to accurate data and actual case files, to 
monitor compliance with policies and procedures.”85 In spite of the 
growth in its area of responsibility for whistleblower complaints over 
the past two decades, OSHA has seen no appreciable increase in its 
whistleblower investigator staffing levels.86 
Empirical research has lent support to the notion that SOX’s 
protections are inadequate. The Dyck Study found that after the 
enactment of SOX, the percentage of whistleblowers who were 
employees fell from eighteen to thirteen percent87 If in fact SOX 
provided robust protection for whistleblowers, one would have 
expected the trend to move in the opposite direction. Success rates 
for SOX whistleblowers were terrible in the early years of the Act. 
Only 3.6% of cases were initially resolved by OSHA in favor of 
complaining employees, and only 6.5% of appeals to Department of 
Labor Administrative Law Judges were successful.88  
Ultimately, SOX “failed to fulfill the great expectations 
generated by the Act’s purportedly strong anti-retaliation 
protections.”89  
 
 82. See supra note 8. 
 83. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-722, WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION: 
SUSTAINED MANAGEMENT ATTENTION NEEDED TO ADDRESS LONG-STANDING PROGRAM 
WEAKNESSES 2 (2010). 
 84. Id. at 24. 
 85. Id. at 2. 
 86. Id. at 16–17. 
 87. Dyck et al., supra note 30, at 2250. 
 88. Moberly, supra note 43, at 67. 
 89. Id. at 74. 
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C. Core Features of the Dodd-Frank Statute 
Although it provided protection for whistleblowers, SOX was 
missing any “financial incentive for whistleblowers or informants.”90 
SOX “scream[ed] out for a bounty program,” given its “exceedingly 
weak” anti-retaliation provision, the massive potential for fraud not 
likely to otherwise be detected by regulators, and the ability to tie 
the value of a bounty to the level of fraud revealed by a 
whistleblower.91 The eventual development of bounties in Dodd-
Frank could potentially represent a “giant step forward for 
whistleblowing.”92 
Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act93 amends the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934,94 creating “Section 21F”.95 The new 
provision applies only to “covered judicial or administrative 
action[s],” defined as judicial or administrative actions brought by 
the SEC “that result[] in monetary sanctions exceeding $1 
million.”96 This threshold can be met by combining sanctions 
obtained in an SEC action with sanctions obtained in “related 
actions,” which include Department of Justice or State Attorney 
General criminal actions or the investigation by Self-Regulatory 
Organizations (SROs), but not the proceeds of private securities 
litigation.97 Although the statute itself seems to imply that sanctions 
paid to some regulatory agency other than the SEC would be 
counted in the calculation of whether or not an action met the $1 
million threshold,98 the SEC’s proposed and final rules, in a narrow 
reading of the statute, only count the proceeds of a related action if 
those sanctions are paid to the SEC.99 
Other provisions provide anti-retaliation protections for some 
 
 90. Arnold, supra note 10, at 460. 
 91. Gonzalez, supra note 62, at 346. 
 92. Id. at 347. 
 93. Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 15 U.S.C.S. § 78u-6 (Lexis Supp. 2011) (amending § 21F 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 94. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2006). 
 95. Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 15 U.S.C.S. § 78u-6. 
 96. Id. § 78u-6(a)(1).  
 97. See id. § 78u-6(b)(1). 
 98. See id. § 78u-6(a)(1) (“The term ‘covered judicial or administrative action’ means 
any judicial or administrative action brought by the Commission under the securities laws that 
results in monetary sanctions exceeding $1,000,000.”). 
 99. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,363 
(June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-3). 
DO NOT DELETE 2/2/2012 11:58 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
86 
securities fraud whistleblowers who are not protected by SOX,100 but 
the bounty scheme will be the focus of this Article’s discussion. 
The statute defines “whistleblower” as an individual or 
individuals who provide “information relating to a violation of the 
securities laws” to the SEC, leaving to the SEC the task of defining 
rules regarding how that information needs to be submitted.101 To be 
eligible to claim a bounty, a whistleblower must be the source of 
“original information,” defined by the statute as information derived 
from the “independent knowledge or analysis of a whistleblower,” 
“not known to the [SEC] from any other source,” and not 
“exclusively derived from an allegation made in a judicial or 
administrative hearing, in a governmental . . . investigation, or from 
the news media.”102 
Under the statute, the payment of a bounty is mandatory. The 
SEC “shall pay an award” of ten to thirty percent of the collected 
monetary sanctions resulting from “successful enforcement” 
actions.103 The amount of the award—that is, where in the specified 
range an award will fall—is left to the discretion of the SEC, 
although the law provides some guidance. The SEC “shall take into 
consideration” the significance of the information provided, the 
degree of assistance provided by the whistleblower, the 
“programmatic interest” of the SEC in “deterring violations of the 
securities laws by making awards to whistleblowers,” and “additional 
relevant factors,” excluding, however, the “balance”104 of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission Investor Protection Fund used 
 
 100. Katrina Grider, Employment Law Update: US Supreme Court, Fifth Circuit, and 
More, ADVOCATE: TEX. ST. BAR LITIG. SEC. REP., Spring 2011, at 1, 13–14 (“[Section 929A 
of the Dodd-Frank Act] eliminates a significant loophole that some courts have read into SOX 
that has substantially narrowed the scope of SOX coverage. Elevating form over substance, 
some judges have permitted publicly-traded companies to avoid liability under SOX merely 
because the parent company that files reports with the SEC has few, if any, direct employees, 
and instead employs most of its workforce through non-publicly traded subsidiaries.”); see also 
Ted Uliassi, Comment, Addressing the Unintended Consequences of an Enhanced SEC 
Whistleblower Bounty Program, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 351, 357 (2011) (“While the 
antitretaliation cause of action provided by [SOX] to public company employee whistleblowers 
is likely to be available to many [Dodd-Frank] whistleblowers, the [Dodd-Frank] cause of 
action is not limited to whistleblowers who are employees of publicly traded companies.”). In 
addition, Dodd-Frank has a longer statute of limitations period making it a “more attractive 
option.” Id. 
 101. Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 15 U.S.C.S. § 78u-6(a)(6). 
 102. Id. § 78u-6(a)(3). 
 103. Id. § 78u-6(b)(1).  
 104. Id. § 78u-6(c)(1). 
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to pay bounties.105 Government employees and law enforcement 
officers, including state officials, are excluded from bounty eligibility, 
as are whistleblowers convicted of “criminal violations” relating to 
the SEC enforcement action and “any whistleblower who gains the 
information through the performance of an audit of financial 
statements required under the securities laws.”106 Similarly, 
whistleblowers knowingly submitting false information are ineligible 
for a bounty.107 
Whistleblowers are permitted to be represented by counsel, and 
may maintain their anonymity up to the point at which an award is 
paid.108 The decision by the SEC to deny an award may be appealed 
“to the appropriate court of appeals for the United States” within 30 
days after a denial decision is made.109 However, no appeal of the 
amount of the award is authorized.110 
 
1. Evolution of the Act 
 
Several important changes occurred between the original 
submission of the proposal as part of the Obama Administration’s 
Investor Protection Act of 2009 (submitted on July 22, 2009) and 
Dodd-Frank’s eventual enactment.  In the Administration’s original 
draft, the SEC was granted purely discretionary authority to pay 
 
 105. This fund was created in § 922 of Dodd-Frank. Id. § 78u-6(g). Money to be 
deposited in the account includes any monetary sanctions collected for enforcement actions 
not allocated to an investor compensation “Fair Fund” pursuant to § 308 of SOX. Id. The 
“Fair Fund provision of Sarbanes-Oxley allows the SEC to distribute money penalties to 
injured investors” and “herald[ed] a new compensatory role for the agency.” Verity Winship, 
Fair Funds and the SEC’s Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1103, 1103 
(2008). Prior to the enactment of SOX, any monetary sanctions not considered 
“disgorgement” of ill-gotten gains were paid into the U.S. Treasury. Id. at 1118. However, 
the Commission retained discretion to decide whether sanctions would be allocated to the 
fund. Id. at 1119.  
  In addition to paying awards, the fund can be used to fund SEC Inspector General 
activities. 15 U.S.C.S. § 78u-6(g)(2)(B). This represented a change from the original version 
of the Act, in which the fund could be used either to compensate whistleblowers or to fund 
“investor education initiatives designed to help investors protect themselves against securities 
fraud or other violations of the securities laws, or the rules and regulations thereunder.” 
Investor Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 3817, 111th Cong. § 21F(f) (2009). 
 106. Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 15 U.S.C.S. § 78u-6(c)(2). 
 107. Id. § 78u-6(i). 
 108. Id. § 78u-6(d). 
 109. Id. § 78u-6(f). 
 110.  Id. 
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awards of up to thirty percent.111 In the final law, however, the 
payment of awards was mandatory.112 The original draft included no 
minimum payment floor,113 leaving open the possibility of bounties 
below ten percent. These changes were made in Senator Dodd’s 
“committee print” of his Restoring American Financial Stability Act, 
submitted on March 15, 2010.114 That version of the bill also added 
the criteria under which the SEC would determine the amount of 
the award.115 
Similarly, in the original draft of the Act, the decision to pay an 
award could not be appealed.116 In the final version of the Act, the 
appeal of a denial of an award, but not the amount of the award, can 
be made to a U.S. Circuit Court.117 Senator Dodd’s early drafts of 
the bill would have included the right to appeal the SEC’s 
determination of “what amount to make awards.”118 However, the 
right to appeal was later limited to the decision of whether to make 
an award, with no right to appeal the amount of the award.119 
Senator Dodd explained that “the whistleblower cannot appeal the 
SEC’s monetary award determination,” and that this amendment  
was made so as to “limit the SEC’s administrative burden and not to 
encourage making small awards.”120 
The Administration’s original bill also omitted the extensive 
definition of “original source” that was included in the final bill. The 
Administration’s bill simply stated that a whistleblower “who 
voluntarily provided original information” could be paid a bounty.121 
 
 111.  Investor Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 3817, 111th Cong. § 922 (2009) (proposing 
to amend the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 by inserting section 21F), available at 
http://www.llsdc.org/attachments/files/265/Adm-bill-T09-A.pdf. 
 112.  Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 15 U.S.C.S. § 78u-6(b). 
 113. H.R. 3817 § 922 (proposing to amend section 21F(b) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act). 
 114. Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 922 
(2010) (proposing to amend the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 section 21F(b)(1)). For 
the legislative history, see S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 111, 231 (2010). 
 115. H.R. 3817 § 922 (proposing to amend section 21F(c)(1)).  
 116. Id. (proposing to amend section 21F(e)). 
 117. Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 15 U.S.C.S. § 78u-6(f) (Lexis Supp. 2011) (amending 
section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 118. S. 3217 § 922 (proposing to amend section 21F(f). 
 119. Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 15 U.S.C.S. § 78u-6(f) (amending section 21F of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 120. 156 CONG. REC. S5929 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
 121. H.R. 3817 § 922 (proposing to add section 21F(a) to the Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934). 
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The lengthier definition that appeared in the final bill was added in 
Senator Dodd’s Discussion Draft, submitted on November 10, 
2009.122  
The limitation on accountants who discovered fraud in 
connection with an audit required by the securities laws was also 
added after the Administration’s original draft.123 It first appeared in 
the version of Senator Dodd’s bill reported by the Committee on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on April 15, 2010.124 
2. Congressional testimony 
There was relatively little debate in congressional hearings 
focused on the whistleblower component of the financial reform 
package prior to the law’s enactment.125 In hearings of the House 
Committee on Financial Services on July 17, 2009, Representative 
Paul Kanjorski (D-PA) described the goals of the program: “[W]e 
ought to put more cops on the beat by allowing the Commission to 
pay bounties to whistleblowers whose tips result in catching  
fraudsters.”126 He repeated this “cops on the beat” view in hearings 
later that year.127 
On October 6, 2009, Denise Crawford, Texas Securities 
Commissioner and President of the North American Securities 
Administrators Association, an organization of state Blue Sky law 
regulators, suggested that “the problem isn’t that people weren’t 
 
 122. Discussion Draft of Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009, S. 3217 
111th Cong. § 922 (2009), available at http://www.llsdc.org/attachments/files/276/Bill-
111th-S3217-Discussion-draft.pdf. 
 123. Id. § 923 (proposing to amend section 21F(b)(2)). 
 124. S. 3217, 111th Cong. (2010), available at http://www.llsdc.org/attachments/ 
files/275/bill-111th-S3217-Cmte-Prt.pdf.  
 125. See Recent Legislation, Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 128 Stat. 1376, 
1841–49 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6), 124 HARV. L. REV. 1829, 1830 (2011) 
(“Although the progress of the Dodd-Frank bill through the House and Senate was marked by 
intense industry lobbying and divisive partisan struggles, the whistleblower provisions received 
little attention on the road to passage.”). 
 126. Industry Perspectives on the Obama Administration’s Financial Regulatory Reform 
Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 111th Cong. 62 (2009), available at 
http://democrats.financialservices.house.gov/Hearings/hearingDetails.aspx?NewsID=1150. 
 127. Additional Reforms to the Securities Investor Protection Act: Hearing Before the H. 
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 
111th Cong. 94 (2009), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/Media/file/ 
hearings/111/Printed%20Hearings/111-94.pdf. 
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coming to the Securities and Exchange Commission.”128 She noted 
that that the SEC receives close to 750,000 tips a year, but the 
“problem is that they were ignoring them or at least not making 
good determinations with regard to those complaints that really 
needed to be followed up on.”129 The problem wasn’t that 
whistleblowers were “reticent to complain,” but that “they are not 
getting the response of the agency presently.”130 
3. Discussion 
Several features of the statute deserve particular comment. Some 
of the language of the statute is clearly designed to avoid the pitfalls 
that have emerged in judicial interpretation of similar provisions of 
the FCA. The FCA bars suits “based upon the public disclosure of 
allegations” at various hearings, governmental investigations, or in 
the news media.131 Some courts have interpreted “based upon” to 
mean “derived from,” but other courts have interpreted “based 
upon” more broadly, akin to “similar to,” to impose jurisdictional 
bans on many potential FCA plaintiffs.132 The Dodd-Frank Act 
avoids this kind of potential limitation for bounty seekers by limiting 
the “public disclosure” restriction to potential tipsters whose 
information was exclusively based on the public proceedings or media 
coverage. Additionally, the FCA requires bounty seekers to 
demonstrate that they had “direct and independent” knowledge; the 
“direct[ness]” requirement imposes “[t]he most significant 
limitation” by requiring relators to see fraud with their own eyes.133 
Wisely, the Dodd-Frank provision avoids this potential restriction by 
declining to include the word “direct.” Instead, the new law merely 
requires that the information be based on “independent” 
knowledge.  
The new law also adds “independent . . . analysis” to the list of 
 
 128. Capital Markets Regulatory Reform: Strengthening Investor Protection, Enhancing 
Oversight of Private Pools of Capital, and Creating a National Insurance Office: Hearing before 
the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 111th Cong. 84 (2009), available at http:// 
financialservices.house.gov/Media/file/hearings/111/Printed%20Hearings/111-84.pdf. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 132. Beverly Cohen, Trouble at the Source: The Debates Over the Public Disclosure 
Provisions of the False Claims Act’s Original Source Rule, 60 MERCER L. REV. 701, 716–17 
(2009). 
 133. Id. at 718–21. 
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how a whistleblower can qualify as a source of “original 
information.” In the FCA context, relators have been able to claim 
bounties where they conduct an investigation uncovering 
information about fraud even though the information uncovered 
came from some other source. Still, in that context “[c]ourts have 
imposed an extremely high standard before finding a private 
investigation equivalent to direct and independent knowledge.”134 In 
the FCA context, mere “independent analysis” is not likely to be 
found sufficient to trigger a bounty.135 The Dodd-Frank provision 
invites the SEC to be more open to paying bounties in circumstances 
where the analysis conducted by a whistleblower provides the key 
component of her “information.” Where an independent analysis 
creates new “information,” a whistleblower might qualify for a 
Dodd-Frank bounty. 
However, the $1 million threshold is more problematic. 
Penalties imposed by the SEC include nonmonetary sanctions. 
Historically, the SEC was only permitted to seek injunctive relief and 
disgorgement of illicit profits through courts’ equitable powers to 
fashion “ancillary relief.”136 In 1990, the Remedies Act gave the SEC 
authority to seek disgorgement in administrative proceedings (as 
opposed to just in judicial proceedings)137 and “broad power, both in 
court and in administrative proceedings, to seek penalties for any 
violation of the federal securities statutes.”138 
Even after the 1990 Act, however, nonmonetary sanctions “are 
common” and include “cease-and-desist orders or permanent 
injunctions” that in fact “appear to impose extremely small 
penalties.”139 The “crown jewels” of SEC settlements are “obey-the-
law injunction[s],”140 which are broad orders “prohibiting the 
 
 134. Id. at 725. 
 135. See id.; United States ex rel. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1160 
(3d Cir. 1991) (holding that under the FCA, relators must have substantive information about 
the fraud, not just background information allowing them to “understand the significance of a 
publicly disclosed transaction or allegation”). 
 136. Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors?, 63 
BUS. LAW. 317, 320 (2008). 
 137. Id. at 321. 
 138. Id. at 323. 
 139. Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 594 (2008). 
 140. Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Therapeutics at the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 793, 818. 
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defendant from future violations of securities laws.”141 Such 
injunctions—in and of themselves—involve no monetary sanction, 
provide no “restitution for the victims of violations,” and may 
impose few “costs on securities violators who may have profited 
enormously from their misconduct.”142 What is the crown jewel for 
the SEC has been referred to by the U.S. Supreme Court as a “mild 
prophylactic.”143 Moreover, the SEC has recently begun to seek what 
Jayne Barnard refers to as “therapeutic settlements”—resolving 
enforcement actions by having wrongdoers “creat[e] . . . new 
management positions, adopt[] . . . new accounting and reporting 
practices, reconfigur[e] . . . corporate training programs, and 
establish[] . . . specific board-level committees and procedures.”144 
The SEC’s preference for nonmonetary enforcement may only be 
growing. 
Monetary penalties are “less common.”145 Of the firms targeted 
by the SEC between 1978 and 2002, only eight percent—just 47 
out of 585—were assessed a monetary penalty.146 The mean 
monetary penalty was over $100 million.147 However, this mean 
figure is misleading as an indication of the typical sanction because 
its value is inflated by the $2.28 billion fine levied against 
WorldCom.148 The median fine (which measures the middle point 
among fines levied, rather than an average) was far lower—just 
$890,000.149  
In other words, the SEC imposes fines that could trigger Dodd-
Frank’s whistleblower bounty provision less than ten percent of the 
time, and in those cases, more than half of fined firms faced fines 
below the minimum $1 million threshold needed to trigger award 
eligibility. These figures may indeed overstate the potential reach of 
 
 141. Jon Carlson, Note, Securities Fraud, Officer and Director Bars, and the “Unfitness” 
Inquiry After Sarbanes-Oxley, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 679, 682 (2009). Whether 
such broad injunctions are enforceable has been called into question by some federal courts. 
See SEC v. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1232 n.14 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 142. Carlson, supra note 141, at 682. 
 143. Id. at 682 n.22 (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 
193 (1963)). 
 144. Barnard, supra note 140, at 796. 
 145. Karpoff, supra note 139, at 594. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 595. 
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the new bounty law, since now that the law is in place, firms seeking 
to discredit whistleblowers may deliberately target fines below the $1 
million threshold in their settlement discussions with SEC regulators. 
Moreover, since the SEC will not have to process the administrative 
tasks associated with paying a bounty when the fine levied is under 
that threshold, one might expect the SEC to be amenable to 
negotiations producing such lower results. 
The new statute does nothing to allow whistleblowers to capture 
a share of the far greater sanctions levied in civil class actions by 
aggrieved investors.150 Moreover, the largest impact of enforcement 
actions is in lost market value of targeted firms151—something not 
addressed by the new law. The bottom line is that the new law does 
a very poor job of calibrating expected rewards for whistleblowers 
with the true costs of financial fraud for investors. 
A relatively simple solution would be to include the proceeds of 
private securities fraud class actions in calculating the “related 
action” sanctions for establishing the $1 million floor. The problem 
with this solution would be that some whistleblowers would meet 
the $1 million threshold via “related actions” in cases where there 
was no monetary sanction awarded in an SEC enforcement action 
itself and therefore nothing would have been deposited in the SEC’s 
whistleblower fund. This would raise the question of where the 
money to pay an award would come from. Importantly, all sanctions 
obtained by the SEC (other than those allocated to investor 
compensation) are deposited in the new whistleblower fund.152 This 
is the case whether or not a whistleblower is involved in the 
enforcement action, at least until the fund reaches a $300 million 
balance.153 As a result, the solvency of the fund is not likely to ever 
become an issue. 
The $1 million limitation may also exacerbate a potential 
perverse effect of bounties that some critics have attributed to the 
FCA. These critics have suggested that the FCA “creates incentives 
for employees to hide fraud until it has reached levels under which 
 
 150. Civil damages were awarded more than five times as often in private cases than fines 
were imposed in enforcement actions. Id.  
 151. Id. 
 152. Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 15 U.S.C.S. § 78u-6(g)(3)(A) (Lexis Supp. 2011) 
(amending § 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 153. Id. 
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their awards for disclosure will be maximized.”154 Whistleblowers 
might thus be encouraged to “‘save up’ information rather than 
taking steps to correct the misconduct of which they are aware.”155 
In connection with the FCA, this criticism may have little 
merit—there is to date little evidence that this often occurs.156 
Moreover, it is hard to establish what process a potential 
whistleblower would use to determine how to “optimize” potential 
rewards for disclosure. Indeed, since the FCA follows a “first-to-file” 
approach157 and only awards bounties to the “original source” of 
information, a potential whistleblower seeking an FCA bounty 
would likely balance any potential gain from delayed reporting 
against the chances of “poaching” by another tipster. In the context 
of Dodd-Frank, however, the hard threshold below which no awards 
are permitted creates a very real possibility that a potential 
whistleblower will be forced to delay reporting until the magnitude 
of fraud seems likely to trigger the bounty provision. Certainly, one 
can imagine plaintiffs’ counsel avoiding filing claims for bounties 
until it appears likely an SEC enforcement action would seek a 
significant penalty as opposed to merely a cease-and-desist order. 
The $1 million floor may also, perversely, limit the incentives for 
whistleblowers in certain contexts where monetary sanctions seem 
unlikely. While sanctions might be sought in connection with Ponzi 
schemes that victimize unsophisticated investors, since there is little 
likelihood of recovering funds, the SEC may settle such cases 
without seeking sanctions that meet the $1 million threshold.158 
Large corporations are also more likely to be subject to large fines; 
small market firms, given the reduced potential for investor loss, are 
less likely to be subjected to SEC actions seeking high levels of 
sanctions but may be precisely the firms most likely to commit fraud 
without concern for private securities litigation.159 Similarly, given 
that the Commission considers ability-to-pay in crafting sanctions,160 
 
 154. Thomas L. Carson et al., Whistleblowing for Profit: An Ethical Analysis of the Federal 
False Claims Act, 77 J. BUS. ETHICS 361, 361–62 (2008). 
 155. Jayne W. Barnard, Evolutionary Enforcement at the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 403, 412 (2010). 
 156. Carson et al., supra note 154, at 362. 
 157. See Richard D. Fincher, Mediating Whistleblower Complaints: Integrating the 
Emotional and Legal Challenges, DISP. RESOL. J., Feb.–Apr. 2009, at 65. 
 158. Black, supra note 136, at 344. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Thomas W. Joo, Legislation and Legitimation: Congress and Insider Trading in the 
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SEC actions against individuals are less likely to trigger bounty 
awards. Individuals, however, are responsible for “caus[ing] entities 
to violate the securities laws.”161  
The $1 million floor represents an arbitrary figure, one Congress 
pulled out of the air with absolutely no explanation of why that 
amount is the only one to merit bounty awards. It has no link to the 
average level of sanction awarded in SEC cases; moreover, since the 
enforcement sanction levied may not precisely track the magnitude 
of fraud on investors, it has no firm connection to the seriousness of 
the offense a whistleblower reports.  
A possible justification for the floor—or a floor in the general 
neighborhood of $1 million—might be that it reflects what would be 
necessary to offset the lost wages to a whistleblower for a one-year 
period. If bounties were permitted at levels below $1 million in 
enforcement sanctions, the ten to thirty percent bounty share would 
mean whistleblowers were being paid less than $100,000–$300,000 
for bringing information to light. That would, for many financial 
industry employees, be less than what they would have earned in a 
single year had they stayed silent and not blown the whistle. Perhaps 
the $1 million threshold can be justified on the grounds that 
whistleblower bounties are only effective where they provide at least 
a year’s worth of compensation for expected losses in earnings 
resulting from retaliation. However, since whistleblowers enjoy 
separate anti-retaliation protection under SOX, that linkage is 
difficult to defend. 
D. Proposed SEC Rules 
Dodd-Frank required the SEC to develop rules and regulations 
to govern the administration of the new whistleblower provision. 
The initial proposed rules were released on November 3, 2010,162 
with the final rules to be issued by April 21, 2011,163 although the 
 
1980s, 82 IND. L.J. 575, 614 (2007) (explaining that the SEC “considered a defendant’s ability 
to pay when requesting penalties”).  
 161. Black, supra note 136, at 344. 
 162. Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 75 Fed. Reg. 70,488 (proposed Nov. 3, 2010) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249) [hereinafter SEC Proposed Rules]. 
 163. See SEC, ANN. REP. ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 4 (Oct. 2010), available at  
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/whistleblower_report_to_congress.pdf. 
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SEC missed that deadline by a month.164 The SEC formed a cross-
disciplinary working group to draft implementation rules and 
solicited comments from the public.165 The SEC’s proposed 
Regulation 21F sought to provide whistleblower rules that were 
“clearly defined and user-friendly.”166  
Among the important issues considered by the SEC were the 
definition of “voluntary” submissions,167 the scope of “original 
information” and “independent knowledge,”168 and whether 
whistleblowers should be required to submit claims using “in-house 
complaint and reporting procedures, thereby giving employers an 
opportunity to address misconduct, before they make a 
whistleblower submission to the Commission.”169 In the end, the 
Commission decided not to impose what might be thought of as an 
internal exhaustion requirement,170 a decision which has sparked 
controversy. 
In Proposed Rule 21F-4(c), the Commission elaborated on 
when a whistleblower’s information would be deemed to have “led 
to the successful enforcement” of an SEC action.171 The proposed 
rule would have largely required that whistleblowers be the source of 
information leading to the opening of an enforcement action; where 
an action had already been initiated, whistleblowers could only 
recover bounties in the rare case where the information provided was 
“essential” and “would not have otherwise [been] obtained in the 
normal course of the investigation.”172 Since during the ordinary 
course of an investigation the SEC would likely interview many 
corporate employees, most of the information in the hands of a 
potential whistleblower would have likely been found anyway; in 
practice, then, the proposed rule virtually eliminated the possibility 
of a bounty payment except where the whistleblower’s tip leads to 
the onset of enforcement action. The only example provided by the 
SEC of an employee who could potentially qualify for a bounty in 
 
 164. See SEC Final Rules, supra note 14. 
 165. Id. 
 166. SEC Proposed Rules, supra note 162, at 70,488. 
 167. Id. at 70,490–91. 
 168. Id. at 70,491–98. 
 169. Id. at 70,496. 
 170. Id.  
 171. Id. at 70,497 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 172. Id. 
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connection with a previously opened investigation was an employee 
interviewed by the SEC who later comes forward with a hot doc, a 
document that “had been concealed from the staff” and 
“establish[ed] proof of wrongdoing” critical to the SEC 
“sustain[ing] its burden of proof.”173 In practice, most targets of 
SEC investigations are highly cooperative,174 so the Commission’s 
expectation that such payments would be “rare”175 is likely an 
understatement. 
The proposed rules also required that the whistleblower’s 
information “‘significantly contribute[]’ to the success of an 
enforcement action.”176 To meet that requirement, in effect, the 
statute’s causation element, a whistleblower would need to submit 
high-quality, reliable, specific information that is “meaningful[ly]” 
connected to the successful enforcement action.177 Vague 
information, unsupported tips, or “tangential evidence” would not 
meet this requirement.178 Moreover, even where an SEC 
enforcement action is successful, if the whistleblower’s information 
was linked to claims rejected by a court, the whistleblower would be 
excluded from claiming a bounty—even if the investigation itself was 
initiated based on those eventually rejected claims and uncovered 
other actionable examples of fraud.179 
 
 
 173. Id. at 70,498. 
 174. Companies will usually “cooperate fully in the federal investigation, and then 
implement stringent compliance policies and internal monitors.” Bruce Hinchey, Punishing the 
Penitent: Disproportionate Fines in Recent FCPA Enforcements and Suggested Improvements, 40 
PUB. CONT. L.J. 393, 418 (2011). A “substantial body of anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
SEC regularly asks subjects of its investigations to effect a broad waiver of privilege by turning 
over internal reports and other protected materials.” Elias C. Selinger, An Unredeemed 
Promise: How Courts Can Prevent Offensive Collateral Estoppel from Undercutting the Policy 
Goals of Amended Federal Rule of Evidence 408, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1953, 1966 (2008). 
Choosing not to cooperate comes at a stiff price, and can make it more likely that the target 
will be referred to the Department of Justice for a criminal investigation. Id. It will “usually 
benefit a corporation to cooperate with the SEC . . . .” Christine J. Unger, Note, Section 1103 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Securities and Exchange Commission v. Gemstart-TV Guide 
International Inc, and the Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation of “Extraordinary Payments,” 29 W. 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 231, 250 (2006). 
 175. SEC Proposed Rules, supra note 162, at 70,497–98. 
 176. Id. at 70,497. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id.  
 179. Id. at 70,498. 
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In elaborating on the statute’s guiding criteria180 for determining 
the amount of an award within the authorized ten to thirty percent 
range, the Commission added several considerations. The SEC could 
also consider 1) whether the subject matter of the investigation “is a 
Commission priority;” 2) any “unique hardships experienced by the 
whistleblower as a result of his or her reporting and assisting in the 
enforcement action;” 3) whether prior to providing tips “the 
whistleblower took steps to prevent the violations from occurring or 
continuing,” as well as any remedial steps taken by the 
whistleblower; and 4) “whether, and the extent to which, a 
whistleblower reported the potential violation through effective 
internal whistleblower, legal or compliance procedures before 
reporting the violation to the Commission.”181 While not a 
requirement for obtaining an award in the Commission’s proposed 
rules, internal reporting would trigger a “higher percentage 
award.”182 
The Commission’s proposed rules excluded from the calculation 
of the monetary sanctions to be imposed any sanctions paid by the 
whistleblower or by an entity based on actions the whistleblower 
directed, planned, or initiated.183 The SEC also added foreign 
officials to the categories of excluded individuals provided by the 
statute.184 In addition, the proposed rules would exclude from 
bounty payments anyone who had a “pre-existing legal or 
contractual duty to report the securities violations.”185 Such 
individuals would not be considered to have made “voluntary” 
submissions of information, given the existence of a legal duty.186 As 
examples, the Commission mentions law enforcement officers, 
regulators, SRO employees, and auditors retained to file either 
annual or other reports with the SEC, but also includes “other 
similarly situated persons.”187 
The SEC received 240 comment letters from a variety of sources 
on its proposed rules, along with 1,300 form letters connected to a 
 
 180. See supra text accompanying note 105. 
 181. SEC Proposed Rules, supra note 162, at 70,500. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 70,509. 
 184. Id. at 70,515. 
 185. Id. at 70,520.  
 186. Id. at 70,491. 
 187. Id. 
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petition.188 Some comments supported the proposed rule, while 
many were critical—some because commenters felt the rules went 
too far, others because they felt the rules did not go far enough to 
reward whistleblowers. 
The Auditing Standards Committee of the American Accounting 
Association argued that the rules did not provide enough of an 
incentive for whistleblowers. The Committee, for instance, saw 
“little support for the $1,000,000 minimum,” noting that in a case 
“settled for just under the minimum, the whistleblower would 
receive nothing.”189 The Auditing Standards Committee also argued 
against a requirement of internal reporting,190 but a number of 
accounting industry firms contacted the SEC to urge that such a 
requirement be adopted. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP wrote to 
argue that the proposed rules “do not go far enough to ensure that 
any information reported to the SEC pursuant to the whistleblower 
rules will be reported internally on at least a contemporaneous 
basis.”191 Similarly, the Institute for Internal Auditors wrote to urge 
the rule be amended to “explicitly require that whistleblowers have 
first utilized their company’s internal reporting process—or 
demonstrated to the Commission’s satisfaction that such a process 
was nonexistent or ineffective—in order to be eligible for receiving 
any award.”192 KPMG wrote to argue that the exclusion of public 
company accounting employees from claiming bounties was too 
narrow.193 
The issue of whether reporting should be required first via 
internal channels has proven one of the most controversial aspects of 
the new law. In a September 24, 2010, hearing before the House 
Committee on Financial Services, Darla Stuckey, the Senior Vice 
 
 188. See Comments on Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of 
Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC.GOV,  
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310.shtml (last visited Jan. 21, 2012); SEC 
Final Rules, supra note 14, at 34,300. 
 189. See Eileen Taylor et al., Comment Letter on file No. S-33-10, SEC.GOV (Dec. 17, 
2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-224.pdf. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Pricewaterhouse Coopers, Comment Letter on File No. S-33-10, SEC.Gov (Dec. 22, 
2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-281.pdf. 
 192. Richard F. Chambers, Comment Letter on File No. S7-33-10, SEC.GOV (Dec. 17, 
2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-229.pdf. 
 193. KPMG, Comment Letter on File No. S-33-10 (Dec. 17, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-152.pdf. 
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President for Policy and Advocacy at the Society of Corporate 
Secretaries and Governance Professionals, argued that under the new 
law “employee[s] will now have a significant financial incentive to 
bypass raising the issue with the company at all for fear of losing the 
bounty, because if he raises to the company first, the company might 
beat him or her to the SEC.”194 She pointed to an ad playing before 
showings of the new movie Wall Street: Money Never Sleeps, which 
attempts to recruit whistleblowers to the web site SECsnitch.com by 
promising “potential riches” and the chance to “do a good thing.”195 
She testified that the new law would be “contrary to long-established 
public policy” and “undercuts the well-established internal 
compliance programs put in place after SOX that companies have 
spent so much money on.”196 She argued that bounties should not 
be granted only where “the whistleblower bypasses the company.”197 
Similarly, Covington and Burling, the Washington, D.C., law 
firm, submitted a letter on behalf of a number of Fortune 500 
corporations. The letter argued that the Commission ought to use its 
broad grant of authority under the statue to define the appropriate 
rules for implementation of whistleblower bounties to impose a 
requirement on bounty-seekers that they make use of an “effective 
internal reporting procedure[]” or lose eligibility for an award.198 
Also controversial is the exclusion of individuals who have pre-
existing legal or contractual duties to report securities violations. The 
National Whistleblower Center urged this portion of the proposed 
rules be cut and argued that it was not required by the statute.199 As 
compromise language, the Center suggested that the Commission 
limit only those employees with “an explicit and binding pre-existing 
legal duty” of which the “whistleblower is aware.”200 One objection 
to the proposed rules is that covered firms could easily circumvent 
 
 194. Executive Compensation Oversight After the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 111th Cong. 27 (2010) 
(statement of Darla Stuckey, Senior Vice President for Policy and Advocacy at the Society of 
Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals). 
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 196. Id. 
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 198. Robert A. Long et al., Comment Letter on File No. S-33-10, SEC.GOV (Feb. 18, 
2011), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-283.pdf. 
 199. Stephen Kohn, Comment Letter on File No. S-33-10, SEC.GOV (March 17, 2011), 
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them by including in employment contracts a contractual 
requirement to report violations to the SEC. Moreover, it is possible 
that the Commission or courts could adopt an expansive view of 
common law fiduciary duties that, for some employees, requires 
disclosure (so as to trigger the benefits of cooperation with the SEC) 
and would thus be a bar to claiming a bounty. 
The National Whistleblower Center also criticized the SEC’s 
approach to linking bounties to “significant contribut[ions] to the 
success of the action,” arguing that recovery of bounties should also 
be permitted where the tip “led to the successful enforcement of the 
law.”201 
E. Post-Enactment Legislative Proposals 
In May 2011, as the SEC neared finalization of its proposed 
rules, Republican members of Congress began to attack the Dodd-
Frank reforms through what detractors, according to National Public 
Radio, called “death by a thousand cuts.”202 
Among the Dodd-Frank provisions targeted was the 
whistleblower bounty measure. Freshman Congressman Michael 
Grimm (R-NY), a former FBI agent, introduced a discussion draft of 
a bill that would have made several changes,203 most notably 
requiring internal reporting in order to trigger eligibility for a 
bounty.204 The bill would also have eliminated the mandatory 
minimum for a bounty, enabling the SEC to pay no bounty even in 
high-sanction cases.205 Finally, in an unusual provision, the bill would 
have prohibited contingency fee arrangements for attorneys 
representing whistleblowers.206 I was among the witnesses who 
 
 201. Id. at 11. 
 202. Audie Cornish, Republicans Propose ‘Tweaks’ to New Financial Rules, NPR (May 10, 
2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/05/10/136057308/republicans-propose-tweaks-to-new-
financial-rule.  
 203. See H.R. 2483, 112th Cong. (Discussion Draft 2011), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/050411propdfchanges.pdf. 
 204. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Legislative Proposals to Address the Negative 
Consequences of the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions: Written Testimony Submitted to the 
U.S. House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government 
Sponsored Enterprises 3–4 (Univ. of Toledo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2011-02), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1844586. 
 205. Id.  
 206. Id.  
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testified in the committee hearings on the bill held on May 11,207 in 
which a significant amount of time was dedicated to the contingency 
fee provision. I argued that it was contrary to the established practice 
in other areas of whistleblower law;208 indeed, outside of criminal 
defense work and domestic relations law there are no widespread 
outright prohibitions on contingency fee arrangements.209 
Congressman Grimm introduced the bill as H.R. 2483, the 
Whistleblower Improvement Act of 2011,210 on July 11. Although 
the final bill deleted the controversial contingency fee prohibition, 
the bill is likely to face opposition in the United States Senate and 
“significant hurdles to make it through Congress.”211 
 
F. Final Rules 
The SEC voted 3-2 to adopt its final whistleblower rules on May 
25, 2011.212 The Final Rules did not embrace the business 
community’s preferred internal reporting requirement, but did 
emphasize those aspects of the rules that encouraged internal 
reporting.213 Positive participation in an internal reporting process 
would increase the percentage level for a whistleblower’s bounty, 
 
 207. A webcast of the hearings is available at http://financialserv.edgeboss.net/ 
wmedia/financialserv/hearing0511112pm.wvx. 
 208. Rapp, supra note 204, at 7. 
 209. The ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit contingency fees in 
connection with criminal defense and domestic relations. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R.  
1.5 (1983). Otherwise, “America’s contingency fee system operates relatively unrestrained.” 
Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, The Importance of Authenticity, Necessity, and 
Learning from Our Mistakes, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 551, 566 (2011). There are a few stray state 
statutes restricting contingent fee arrangements, for instance, in connection with lobbying for 
the passage of particular legislation. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 101.77 (West 2010); 
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 305.22 (West 2010). However, such examples are not comparable 
to the representation of a whistleblower seeking a bounty; they are justified based on concerns 
about their effect on the lawmaking process and good government. 
 210. H.R. 2483, 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
billtext.xpd?bill=h112-2483. 
 211. Ashby Jones, For Whistleblower Fans, A Grimm Proposal, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (May 
5, 2011, 4:52 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/05/05/for-whistleblower-fans-a-
grimm-proposal/. 
 212. Samuel Estreicher & Terri Chase, SEC Issues Final Rules on Whistleblower Protections 
and Bounty Program, N.Y. L.J. (July 13, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/ 
PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202500480179&SEC_Issues_Final_Rules_on_Whistleblower_Protectio
ns_and_Bounty_Program&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1. 
 213. SEC Final Rules, supra note 14, at 34,300–01. 
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while “interference” with an internal process would lead to a reduced 
award.214 This was among the factors listed in the initial proposed 
rules, but it received greater emphasis in the final version.215 The 
final rules also added two provisions to avoid undercutting internal 
reporting systems. First, if a whistleblower reported internally and a 
company then contacted the SEC, the information reported by the 
company would be attributed to the whistleblower, in effect, 
reducing the incentive to bypass the company that some have 
attributed to the proposed rules.216 Second, whistleblowers were 
given an additional thirty days to report their concerns to the SEC 
(to 120 days from ninety in the proposed rules).217 
The final rules adopted a somewhat simplified claims process.218 
In addition, the final rules provided that if a whistleblower’s report 
to the SEC led to multiple actions producing sanctions below the $1 
million level that collectively totaled more than $1 million, those 
could be aggregated to determine whether the minimum sanction 
needed to trigger an award had been obtained.219 
The final rules also softened the requirements for “voluntary” 
disclosure. Under the final rules, a whistleblower could be entitled to 
a bounty so long as the whistleblower provided information prior to 
a request by the government to provide the information;220 in other 
words, unlike under the Proposed Rules, a whistleblower need not 
be the initial source responsible for the opening of an investigation. 
Similarly, the final rules relaxed the “pre-existing legal duty rule.” 
Under the final rules, only pre-existing duties to report violations to 
the Commission (as opposed to higher authorities within a 
corporation) would be grounds for exclusion from reward 
eligibility.221 Only preexisting duties arising from contracts with the 
Commission or another regulatory authority would provide a basis 
for denial due to the existence of a contract; a corporation now 
cannot avoid triggering bounties by inserting language into  
 
 214. Id. at 34,301. 
 215. The final version carved the provision out in its own paragraph, rather than listing it 
among the factors to be taken into account. Id. at 34,367. 
 216. Id. at 34,301. 
 217. Id. at 34,360. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 34,301. 
 220. Id. at 34,364. 
 221. Id. at 34,309. 
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employment contracts mandating that employees report violations to 
the SEC.222 
The Commission made substantial changes in the rules 
concerning the meaning of “[i]nformation that leads to successful 
enforcement,” lowering the standard for whistleblowers.223 The final  
rules deleted the words “significantly contributed” to the success of 
an action from the standard for triggering an award.224 
III. UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES FRAUD 
A. The Fraud Triangle 
Fraud costs a typical organization five percent of its annual 
revenue.225 Globally, that meant $2.9 trillion dollars in losses as a 
result of fraud in 2009 alone.226 In tough economic times, rates of 
fraud typically rise.227 A slowing economy may increase pressure on 
companies to satisfy short-term financial objectives, pressure which 
can sometimes stimulate fraud.228 Economic downturns also leave 
individuals in less secure financial situations, which can provide 
motivation to commit fraud.229 In recent years, the highest rates of 
financial fraud occurred during recession periods.230 Moreover, 
securities fraud has particular social costs, in addition to those visited 
on the victims of fraud, since potential investors’ fear of fraud makes 
them less likely to purchase shares without being compensated by 
way of a discount.231 
Fraud is one of the oldest concepts in Anglo-American law. It 
 
 222. Id.  
 223. Id. at 34,365. 
 224. Id.  
 225. ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, 2010 REPORT TO THE NATIONS, available 
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 227. Carmen Nobel, 4 Ways to Avoid Small-Business Fraud, THE STREET (July 13, 2010, 
7:26 AM), http://www.thestreet.com/story/10803855/1/4-ways-to-avoid-small-business-
fraud.html?cm_ven=GOOGLEN. 
 228. Albert P. Lilienfeld, Financial Fraud: Does an Economic Downturn Mean an 
Uptick?, in AUDIT COMMITTEE WORKSHOP 2009: MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 497, 499 (PLI Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 
19189). 
 229. Id. at 500. 
 230. Id. at 499. 
 231. Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A 
Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2179 (2010). 
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has its origins in the independent writ of deceit, which existed in 
England as early as the thirteenth century.232 As a legal concept, 
fraud requires plaintiffs to prove the elements of the offense, ranging  
from three233 to five234 to six235 to nine236 to eleven237 across 
jurisdictions.  
In its most discrete three-element form, fraud requires a plaintiff 
to show defendant made a material false statement with intent to 
induce reliance, on which the plaintiff justifiably relied, resulting in 
damages.238 Securities fraud, most notably the SEC’s Rule 10b-5,239 
mirrors in large part these common law elements.240 
One explanatory theory for fraud consists of Donald Cressey’s 
so-called “fraud triangle”: Opportunity, Pressure, and 
 
 232. The writ of deceit existed since at least 1201 A.D. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 727 (5th ed. 1984). 
 233. Randy D. Gordon, Rethinking Civil RICO: The Vexing Problem of Causation in 
Fraud-Based Claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 319, 324 n.30 (2005). 
 234. See Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268, 274 (Cal. 2004) (“The 
elements of fraud are: (1) a misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or 
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 238. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977) (“One who fraudulently makes a 
misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to act 
or refrain from action in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for 
pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.”). 
 239. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1948) (amended 1951). 
 240. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005). 
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Rationalization.241 The opportunity to commit fraud arises when 
there is a lack of internal control, inadequate supervision and review, 
a lack of separate authority, and an inadequate system for detecting 
and punishing fraud. Pressure to commit fraud can result from 
employees’ personal financial problems, vices and addictions, and 
unrealistic performance goals. Rationalization by fraudsters helps 
overcome natural and learned inhibitions as individuals conceive of 
justifications for their illicit conduct. Examples of common forms of 
rationalization include retaliation (a fraudster is responding to a 
perceived injustice against him), “everyone else is doing it,”242 
temporary violations to be remedied later243—that is, “I will pay it 
back,”244 “the firm can afford it,”245 “I’m not hurting anyone,”246 
and the like.247 
Securities fraud operates under these same dynamics. The 
separation of ownership and control in modern firms creates agency 
costs, with managers’ incentives poorly aligned at times with those of 
investors. Because the costs for investors of monitoring managers are 
prohibitive, managers have the opportunity to engage in securities 
fraud, “best . . . understood as a species of agency costs.”248 
Managers may face pressure to commit fraud in order to “mask[] the 
negative effects of strategic or tactical management decisions on the 
 
 241. JOSEPH T. WELLS, OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE 11 (1997) (citing DONALD 
R. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: A STUDY IN THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF 
EMBEZZLEMENT (1953)).  
 242. The “Crowd Follower” form of fraud involves “people who believe that they’re just 
going with the flow, acting in a way that is consistent with industry practice.” Lori Richards, 
Speech by SEC Staff: “Why Does Fraud Occur and What Can Deter or Prevent It?,” 1732 
PLI/CORP 907, 913 (PLI Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 18789, 
2009).  
 243. Under the “borrower” form of fraud a person may truly believe he is simply 
“‘borrowing’ the money, and intend[s]to pay it back.” Id. at 911. 
 244. Kathleen Barney, This Thing Called Forensic Accounting, ARIZ. ATT’Y, July–Aug. 
2007, at 34, 38. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. J. Michael Cook, Fraud and the Role of the Audit Committee, in SECOND ANNUAL 
DIRECTORS’ INSTITUE ON CORPOATE GOVERNANCE: WHAT BOARD MEMBERS NEED TO 
KNOW TO BE EFFECTIVE TODAY & TOMORROW, 1177, 1182 (PLI Corporate Law and 
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 3254, 2004); Albert Lilienfeld, Antifraud Programs 
and Controls, in AUDIT COMMITTEE WORKSHOP 2005: WHAT AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBERS 
& LAWYERS WHO ADVISE THEM NEED TO KNOW NOW, 371, 391 (PLI Corporate Law and 
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 5944, 2005). 
 248. Rose, supra note 231, at 2182. 
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performance of the company.”249 Securities fraud perpetrators “must 
rationalize or ‘neutralize’ the harm that they do, and the courts are 
full of fraud defendants who, even when confronted with the 
likelihood of a long term in prison, deny the illegality of their 
conduct, minimize its significance, or seek to place the blame on 
somebody else.”250 
Donald Langevoort provided a further elaboration on the source 
of pressure to commit securities fraud, hoping to answer the 
question, “Why do companies falsely portray themselves to the 
capital markets in filings with the [SEC] . . . and through other 
publicity?”251 He argued that securities fraud arises from managers 
receiving inaccurate (or overly rosy) information, which they then 
pass on to shareholders and remain committed to even after the 
information is subsequently revealed as false.252 The “optimism-
commitment whipsaw effect”253 induces pressure to commit fraud 
and provides managers with a rationalization for defrauding 
investors. 
The current framework for combating securities fraud provides 
inadequate checks on the opportunity to commit fraud. While the 
legal and regulatory environment is predicated on the notion that 
regulators will detect fraud, there is very little support for this 
position. Alexander Dyck, an economist at the University of 
Toronto, and his coauthors, recently published a study of 216 major 
scandals between 1996 and 2004.254 The SEC was found to have 
detected just seven percent of reported corporate fraud.255 Similarly, 
private securities litigation does a poor job of rooting out fraud, 
accounting for only three percent of the cases.256 
Policies which stimulate whistleblowing target two of the three 
 
 249. Paul S. Atkins & Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating the Mission: A Critical Review of the 
History and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 367, 
401 (2008). 
 250. Jayne W. Barnard, Securities Fraud, Recidivism, and Deterrence, 113 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 189, 211 (2008) (emphasis added). 
 251. Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why 
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. 
REV. 101, 105 (1997). 
 252. Id. at 108. 
 253. Id. at 147. 
 254. The study looked only at fraud in U.S. companies with more than 750 million in 
assets. Dyck et al., supra note 30, at 2213. 
 255. Id. at 2214. 
 256. Id. 
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legs of the fraud triangle. First, increased whistleblowing raises the 
likelihood of detection, thus reducing the opportunity to commit 
fraud. Second, the threat of whistleblowing—and the public 
condemnation it triggers—makes rationalization more difficult. 
IV. UNDERSTANDING WHISTLEBLOWERS 
The subject of much recent media attention, the “whistleblower” 
was identified as Time magazine’s “Person of the Year” in 2002, 
with a cover depicting Enron “whistleblower” Sherron Watkins, 
Colleen Rowley of the FBI, and Cynthia Cooper of WorldCom.257 
Whistleblowing is the single most effective way to detect fraud. 
Employee disclosures are the most common source of fraud 
detection.258 More than forty percent of fraud detection occurs as a 
result of tips.259  
The first reason why whistleblowing is the best way to detect 
fraud is that whistleblowers who are insiders actually have access to 
information sources. According to the Dyck Study of corporate 
fraud, having access to information “increases an actor’s probability 
of detecting fraud by 15 percentage points.”260 Insiders have both 
access to information itself and to the processes used to cover up the 
truth. 
One of the major impediments to revealing fraud is the cost “of 
identifying and gathering fraud-relevant information,” and insiders 
“face[] a much lower cost (in fact, often no cost)” in discovering 
such information.261 Even though outside interests—like market 
arbitrageurs, short sellers, and regulators—may have reputational or 
financial incentives to seek out fraud, for such actors “detecting 
fraud is like looking for a needle in a haystack.”262 Insider-employee 
whistleblowers “clearly have the best access to information,” since 
 
 257. TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at cover, available at http://www.time.com/ 
time/covers/0,16641,20021230,00.html. Whether Watkins qualifies as a true 
“whistleblower” is a matter of some debate, since she did not at any point take her concerns 
outside of the firm’s leadership. 
 258. Deborah L. Seifert, The Influence of Organizational Justice on the Perceived 
Likelihood of Whistleblowing 1–2 (Dec. 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington 
State University), available at http://www.dissertations.wsu.edu/Dissertations/Fall2006/ 
d_seifert_120806.pdf; Nobel, supra note 227. 
 259. ACFE, supra note 225. 
 260. Dyck et al., supra note 30, at 2215. 
 261. Id. at 2214. 
 262. Id. 
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“[f]ew, if any frauds can be committed without the knowledge and 
often the support of several employees.”263 Insiders often also have 
the technical skills to comprehend the sometimes complex financial 
transactions that are at the core of many modern instances of fraud. 
Insiders are in a unique position because they can “alert 
employers to problems before those problems escalate.”264 Absent 
reporting by internal whistleblowers, “future incidents of massive 
corporate wrongdoing, along the lines of the Enron scandal or the 
Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme might never be revealed, or might 
have been revealed too late.”265 
Without whistleblowing, existing measures to detect fraud in 
financial settings are limited. Government enforcement alone is 
ineffectual “because of the sheer massiveness of the market.”266 
A.  Why Do Whistleblowers Come Forward? 
Whistleblower motives are typically characterized by a high 
degree of complexity.267 The process of whistleblowing may be 
idiosyncratic,268 with the reasons motivating a particular individual 
being unique to that person and her place in an organization. Still, it 
is possible to identify both the incentives that favor individuals 
blowing the whistle and those that caution against such activity. 
Whistleblowers become such at the culmination of a decision 
tree which can lead to one of two outcomes: blow the whistle or stay 
silent. Whether they do so consciously or unconsciously,269 
whistleblowers must engage in a sort of cost-benefit analysis in 
deciding whether, and how, to blow the whistle on corporate 
 
 263. Id. at 2240. 
 264. Sinzdak, supra note 46, at 1635. 
 265. Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Resolving the Continuing Controversy 
Regarding Confidential Informants in Private Securities Fraud Litigation, 19 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 637, 668 (2010). 
 266. Id. at 675. 
 267. Jonathan Macey, Getting the Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical Analysis of 
Whistleblowing and Insider Trading, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1909 (2007). 
 268. Michael Regh et al., Antecedents and Outcomes of Retaliation Against 
Whistleblowers: Gender Differences and Power Relationships, 19 ORG. SCI. 221, 235 (2008). 
 269. One author suggested that most whistleblowers felt they had no choice other than 
to blow the whistle, with “[c]hoiceless choice . . . as close as many whistle-blowers get to 
evaluating their own narratives.” C. Fred Alford, Whistle-Blower Narratives: The Experience of 
Choiceless Choice, 74 SOC. RES. 223, 223, 229 (2007). 
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fraud.270 If we presume they act rationally,271 whistleblowers are 
“people for whom the expected benefits of blowing the whistle 
exceeded the expected costs.”272 However, research on why 
whistleblowers come forward faces a significant methodological 
problem: study subjects will invariably be those who came forward, 
rather than stayed silent. Such analyses will thus “overstate the 
benefits and/or understate the costs” of potential whistleblowing.273  
The benefits of whistleblowing depend in part on the 
professional identity of a potential whistleblower. External analysts 
who discover fraud, for instance, are no more likely to be promoted 
if they blow the whistle, but according to the Dyck Study are less 
likely to be demoted than analysts not involved in whistleblowing.274 
For some potential classes of whistleblowers, then, there may be 
career-related reasons to bring fraud to light. That is not likely to be 
the case for most inside whistleblowers, however, as discussed in the 
section which follows. 
Perhaps the strongest motivating factor for whistleblowers is the 
desire to do the “right” thing.275 Whistleblowing has an ethical 
dimension. Individuals are more likely to report wrongdoing if they 
feel a sense of responsibility (perhaps to “colleagues and employer” 
or to their profession), and where “personal ethical values” favor 
reporting.276 Whistleblowing is more likely when employees have a 
 
 270. Matthias Schmidt, “Whistle Blowing” Regulation and Accounting Standards 
Enforcement in Germany and Europe—An Economic Perspective, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 
143, 152 (2005) (“Within the decision process to blow or not to blow the whistle, the 
observer has to balance benefits of his action with the possible costs.”). 
 271. Whistleblowers are not solely motivated by hard “pros” and “cons”. Instead, 
affective factors, such as one’s self-esteem, can influence the decision to report wrongdoing. 
Mary B. Curtis, Are Audit-Related Ethical Decisions Dependent upon Mood?, 68 J. BUS. ETHICS 
191, 194 (2006). For low self-esteem individuals, the costs of potential whistleblowing may 
appear higher, see id., producing observed patterns of whistleblowing that seem inconsistent 
with the rational-choice framework. Similarly, a negative mood may make individuals adopt the 
attitude that “unethical activities are commonplace,” reducing the pressure to blow the 
whistle. Id.  
 272. Dyck et al., supra note 30, at 2231–32. 
 273. Id. at 2215. 
 274. Id.  
 275. Gregory Liyanarchchi & Chris Newdick, The Impact of Moral Reasoning and 
Retaliation on Whistle-Blowing: New Zealand Evidence, 89 J. BUS. ETHICS 37, 41 (2009) 
(“[O]ne of the most important factors that affect an individual’s decision on whistle-blowing is 
his or her moral behavior . . . . [I]ndividuals with higher levels of moral reasoning are more 
likely to blow the whistle than are individuals with lower levels of moral reasoning.”). 
 276. Curtis, supra note 271, at 193. 
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high level of “moral intensity.”277 Whistleblowers are motivated by 
“altruistic concerns” including “the desire to correct the wrongdoing 
which is harming the interests of the organization itself, the 
consumers, the co-workers and the society at large.”278 
Whistleblowers also want a chance to tell their story, in their own 
words.279 The desire to tell a story becomes more profound as a 
whistleblower wends her way through investigation and litigation, 
awaiting a day in court in which her allegations can finally, at long 
last, be verified or discounted. Successful whistleblowing, after all, 
requires not just an initial report, but “persistence in reporting.”280 
“[O]ne’s commitment to his or her own personal moral judgments is 
a significant determinant of both” the initial reporting and “the 
extent to which one is willing to persevere in that reporting.”281 
Another factor favoring whistleblowing, in some cases, is the 
desire to avoid personal sanction for complicity in fraudulent 
schemes.282 Some whistleblowers may become tipsters to avoid 
prosecution or civil liability for participating in, or covering up, a 
fraudulent scheme. Potential liability appears to have been a 
motivating factor in thirty-five percent of the employee 
whistleblower cases reviewed in the Dyck Study.283 Whistleblowers 
may also reveal fraud to protect their own reputations, although it 
rarely seems to be a concern for subordinate employees, for whom 
changing jobs without whistleblowing may be “the best way to 
avoid . . . reputational loss.”284 
Some whistleblowers may be seeking to retaliate for having been 
dismissed. It is difficult to determine when an employee has been 
dismissed due to expected or actual whistleblowing, or when an 
employee blows the whistle because she has been terminated.285 Still, 
the Dyck Study observed a connection between claims of wrongful 
 
 277. Eileen Z. Taylor & Mary B. Curtis, An Examination of the Layers of Workplace 
Influences in Ethical Judgments: Whistleblowing Likelihood and Perseverance in Public 
Accounting, 93 J. BUS. ETHICS 21, 22 (2010). 
 278. Siddartha Dasgupta & Ankit Kesharwani, Whistleblowing: A Survey of Literature, 9 
IUP J. CORP. GOVERNANCE 57, 62 (2010). 
 279. Alford, supra note 269, at 224. 
 280. Taylor & Curtis, supra note 277, at 23. 
 281. Id. at 30. 
 282. Dyck et al., supra note 30, at 2245. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
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dismissal and whistleblowing by employees, with twenty-nine 
percent of such employee-whistleblowers also bringing wrongful 
dismissal claims.286 It is possible that ineffective employees could seek 
to “fend off legitimate criticism or disciplinary measures” by claiming 
the protected “status of a whistle blower.”287 “Disgruntled 
employees are more likely to [blow the whistle] . . . and revenge is 
often a common feature in whistleblower cases.”288 Moreover, firms 
might be forced to tolerate ineffective employees out of a concern 
for the “enormous trouble” such employees could cause if they were 
to blow the whistle.289 
It is sometimes difficult to assess whether whistleblowers in fact 
lodged frivolous claims, particularly during the investigation of their 
charges, because whistleblowers’ narratives often take on the 
character of a “paranoid narrative.”290 Whistleblowers embrace 
paranoia as “an accurate emotional reading of an emotional 
reality.”291 
Sometimes, whistleblowers are motivated to identify fraud based 
on their status as competitive rivals of fraudsters. In connection with 
the massive Ponzi scheme orchestrated by Wall Street financier 
Bernie Madoff, whistleblower Harry Markopolos repeatedly sought 
to bring the fraud to the attention of regulators, pressing the issue 
for nearly a decade.292 Markopolos was motivated, at least in part, by 
his former status as a rival of Madoff.293 His personal motivation to 
discredit Madoff may be one of the reasons why Markopolos was  
 
 
 
 286. Id. 
 287. Schmidt, supra note 270, at 158 (citing James Gobert & Maurice Punch, 
Whistleblowers, the Public Interest, and the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, 63 MOD. L. REV. 
25, 32 (2000)).  
 288. Macey, supra note 267, at 1907. 
 289. Schmidt, supra note 270, at 159. 
 290. Alford, supra note 269, at 225, 231–33. 
 291. Id. at 231. 
 292. Felicia Smith, Madoff Ponzi Scheme Exposes “The Myth of the Sophisticated Investor”, 
40 U. BALT. L. REV. 215, 241 (2010). 
 293. Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Risky Business: The Credit Crisis and Failure (Part II), 104 
NW. U. L. REV. 421, 428 (2010). Markopolos was a “potential competitor” of Madoff who 
had been asked by his employer to develop a fund that would replicate Madoff’s. Heather 
Hiznay, Recent Development, How the Bernard Madoff Scandal Exposed Weakness in Asset 
Management Regulation, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 383, 413, 420 (2009). 
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ignored by the SEC.294 Again, the lesson may be that regardless of 
the motivations of a whistleblower, fraud may still have occurred. 
B. What Countervailing Incentives Does a Whistleblower Face? 
Like the benefits of whistleblowing, the costs of revealing 
ongoing fraud in the financial setting depend on the category of 
person considering becoming a tipster. For nearly all potential 
whistleblowers—with the possible exception of one kind of external 
whistleblower, journalists295—the costs of blowing the whistle are 
significant.296 Many whistleblowers in the Dyck Study gave a 
sobering perspective on their experience: “If I had to do it over 
again, I wouldn’t.”297 In considering the decision whether or not to 
blow the whistle on fraud, most individuals will be less likely to 
report fraud if the perceived costs are high.298 
For gatekeepers like auditors, blowing the whistle has a “clear 
cost”—the auditor will likely “lose the client”—and there is no 
evidence that blowing the whistle will lead to reputational gains that 
will attract future business.299 
For employees, the most prominent cost of whistleblowing is the 
threat to one’s career. One author put it bluntly: “Most whistle-
blowers are fired.”300 In the Dyck Study, eighty-two percent of 
whistleblowers reported that they were “fired, quit under duress, or 
had significantly altered responsibilities.”301 An earlier study found 
that nearly ninety percent of whistleblowers were fired or 
demoted.302 
One whistleblower was moved into a broom closet, had his 
computer taken away, and was finally shifted to the mailroom (the 
 
 294. Christine Hurt, Evil Has a New Name (and a New Narrative): Bernie Madoff, 2009 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 947, 954 n.45. 
 295. Journalists who break stories of corporate fraud are “more likely to find a better 
job” than peers who do not sleuth out such stories. Dyck et al., supra note 30, at 2215. 
 296. Bowen et al., supra note 32, at 1243 (“[T]he personal cost to the whistle-blower 
can be high.”). 
 297. Dyck et al., supra note 30, at 2216 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 298. Curtis, supra note 271, at 194. 
 299. See Dyck et al., supra note 30, at 2215. 
 300. Alford, supra note 269, at 223. 
 301. Dyck et al., supra note 30, at 2216. 
 302. Kim R. Sawyer, Jackie Johnson, & Mark Holub, The Necessary Illegitimacy of the 
Whistleblower 4 (July 2006) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=917316. 
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individual in question was a nuclear physicist).303 Whistleblowers 
who remain on the job can suffer an “endless chain of abasement.”304 
Others have been referred to psychiatrists.305 Up to twenty-seven 
percent of whistleblowers are sued by their employers.306 Even those 
not retaliated against by their firm may find themselves forced to 
change industries or careers,307 with the potential of being subjected 
to blacklisting even through informal or tacit collusion among 
former colleagues and employers.308 Some sixty-four percent of 
whistleblowers in one study reported being blacklisted from other 
jobs in their field.309 One whistleblower’s lawyer reflected that his 
client would “never get a job in Corporate America again.”310 
Whistleblowers are viewed as likely “repeat offenders,” and 
employing a whistleblower is thought to be risky.311 
Employers appear to “prefer loyal employees to honest ones,”312 
and in many companies “management as well as other employees 
tend to regard whistle blowers as disloyal.”313 Whether 
whistleblowing is in fact incompatible with loyalty to one’s employer 
is open to debate.314 However, because whistleblowing runs contrary 
to the standard notion that loyalty involves “devotion to [an 
employer’s] actual practices irrespective of whether or not they are 
ultimately good for the employer or morally acceptable,”315 
 
 303. Alford, supra note 269, at 230. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Brian Martin & Will Rifkin, The Dynamics of Employee Dissent: Whistleblowers and 
Organizational Jiu-Jitsu, 4 PUB. ORG. REV. 221, 226 (2004); Liyanarchchi & Newdick, supra 
note 275, at 41 (“Another more severe form of retaliation is to order whistle-blowers to take 
psychiatric fitness-for-duty examinations.”). 
 306. Sawyer, supra note 302, at 4. 
 307. Dyck et al., supra note 30, at 2240, 2245. But see Schmidt, supra note 270, at 160 
(“Empirical evidence on the perception of actual retaliation by whistle blowers in carefully 
conducted analyses of various cases in the US is rather mixed.”). 
 308. Janet Malek, To Tell or Not To Tell? The Ethical Dilemma of the Would-Be 
Whistleblower, 17 J. ACCOUNTABILITY IN RES. 115, 118 (2010). 
 309. Sawyer, supra note 302, at 11. 
 310. Dyck et al., supra note 30, at 2245. 
 311. Sawyer, supra note 302, at 2. 
 312. Dyck et al., supra note 30, at 2245. 
 313. Schmidt, supra note 270, at 151. 
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 315. Id. at 266. 
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whistleblowing is often equated with disloyal “snitching.”316 
Empirical evidence documents that employers are reluctant to hire 
individuals who have blown the whistle on past employers, believing 
that whistleblowing is “a breach of employee loyalty to the 
organization.”317 
Even whistleblowers vindicated in a subsequent investigation 
may be considered too high risk for other employers. Similarly, even 
if an employee is not fearful of termination and seeks to remain with 
the same firm after blowing the whistle, she may rightly fear that her 
career advancement will be negatively affected.318 The threat of 
retaliation “creates a strong disincentive for whistle-blowing.”319 
Even where whistleblowers are assured protection against retaliation, 
they may still be discouraged from reporting fraud by the fear that 
such promises will be breached or that such protections are 
illusory.320 Retaliation against whistleblowers may also be affected by 
gender dynamics: at least some research suggests that “female 
whistleblowers may experience more retaliation than male 
whistleblowers.”321 Whistleblowing itself may “represent[] a violation 
of stereotypical role expectations for women,”322 triggering more 
harsh retaliation. 
Even where whistleblowers may enjoy some hope of victory 
thanks to an anti-retaliation provision like the one in SOX, the delays 
associated with obtaining such victory can be costly. In one SOX 
whistleblower case, the plaintiff, although eventually victorious, was 
forced to sell his family farm, move to a smaller house, and 
accumulated nearly $100,000 in legal bills.323 “[W]histleblowers are 
not actually protected in the sense that they can be secure in their 
 
 316. See Fincher, supra note 157, at 64 (“Employers tend to view whistleblowers as 
disloyal and insubordinate, even when the whistleblower does not take the matter outside the 
company.”); Gonzalez, supra note 62, at 326 (“[E]mployees who complain . . . are often 
viewed as snitches.”). 
 317. Liyanarachchi & Newdick, supra note 275, at 40. 
 318. Dyck et al., supra note 30, at 2250–51. In an earlier study of federal employee 
whistleblowers, eighteen percent were assigned to less desirable duties and eleven percent were 
denied a promotion. See Luigi Zingales, Want to Stop Corporate Fraud? Pay off Those Whistle-
Blowers, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2004, at B02.  
 319. Carson et al., supra note 154, at 364. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Rehg et al., supra note 268, at 235. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Earle & Madek, supra note 5, at 25. 
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position while pressing their claims.”324 They face “protracted legal 
battles waged at personal expense.”325 
The threat of retaliation is most salient in connection with 
instances of severe fraud, the kind that would likely impugn the 
organization were it publicly revealed.326 Yet, it is precisely in 
connection with that kind of fraud that the public interest is most 
positively affected by the revelation of wrongdoing. Thus, in that 
context, public policy levers are most needed to encourage 
whistleblowing. 
Of course, actual instances of retaliation against whistleblowers 
are not the best guide to how retaliation affects potential 
whistleblowers. Surprisingly, many whistleblowers do not expect that 
they will be the victims of retaliation.327 Such individuals may be 
operating under an over-optimism bias. But it may very well be that 
other pressures against whistleblowing are more important in 
shaping the decision-making process of potential tipsters. If so, anti-
retaliation provisions like the one in SOX will likely do little to affect 
the level of whistleblowing.328 
In addition to the economic consequences of revealing fraud, 
whistleblowers will experience significant personal hardship while 
their claims are investigated and in connection with subsequent 
litigation. Most will be fired, and among those, most will ultimately 
lose their marriages. A majority will “turn to alcohol or drugs for 
some period during their long journey.”329 Under the harsh glare of 
litigation’s spotlight, a whistleblower can be expected to experience 
“personal attacks on one’s character during the course of a 
protracted dispute.”330 Whistleblowers are often labeled as “‘difficult 
personalit[ies],’ incompetent, inadequately trained,” or erroneous in 
their assessment of fraud.331 A whistleblower’s employee file will be 
“scrutinized and old complaints or allegations pulled out—
 
 324. Id. at 51. 
 325. Carson et al., supra note 154, at 364. 
 326. Regh et al., supra note 268, at 225. 
 327. Sawyer et al., supra note 302, at 10. 
 328. It is possible that the enactment of anti-retaliation provisions could raise awareness 
among potential whistleblowers of the prevalence of retaliation. It is equally plausible, 
however, that anti-retaliation measures could lead potential tipsters to overestimate the 
protection that they will actually be provided. 
 329. Alford, supra note 269, at 223. 
 330. Dyck et al., supra note 30, at 2245. 
 331. Martin & Rifkin, supra note 305, at 229. 
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sometimes from many years earlier—and used to justify [retaliatory] 
actions.”332 Smear campaigns against whistleblowers undermine their 
moral legitimacy and, “by implication, the legitimacy of their 
whistleblowing.”333 As a result, whistleblowers typically feel 
“exhausted, highly emotional, and under severe stress . . . agitated by 
the prospect of confronting the wrongdoers, and depressed and in a 
panic about their career.”334 
Nor can the social costs of whistleblowing be discounted, and 
they may indeed be surprisingly strong.335 Whistleblowing challenges 
the usual workplace realities of “collegiate loyalty and team spirit.”336 
Whistleblowers may experience “distancing and retaliation from 
fellow workers and friends,”337 and come to be treated as 
outsiders.338 Whistleblowers can face “extensive ostracism” which 
may overwhelm any protection the anti-retaliation provisions of SOX 
provides.339 In one study, twenty percent of federal employee 
whistleblowers reported being “shunned” by co-workers and 
managers, and twenty-five percent reported being the target of 
verbal harassment or intimidation.340 
One source of this ostracism is likely the significant negative 
effects whistleblowing tends to have on the long-run trajectory of 
the firms involved. Firms targeted by whistleblowers are “more likely 
to restate their earnings and be subject to shareholder litigation in 
the three years following the whistle-blowing allegation.”341 
Whistleblowing tends to “be an early indicator of future negative 
economic consequences for targeted firms.”342 Co-employees of a 
 
 332. Id. 
 333. Sawyer, supra note 302, at 11. 
 334. Fincher, supra note 157, at 67. 
 335. Matthew J. Marquez, The Rejection of Moral Rebels: Resenting Those Who Do the 
Right Thing, 95 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 76, 76 (2008) (“The violence of this 
backlash against whistleblowers . . . is surprising precisely because the exact same behavior 
draws admiration and respect from observers not directly involved in the situation—and also 
because this rejection does not just come from peers who stand to suffer . . . but also from 
peers who merely failed to report . . . abuse.”). 
 336. Wim Vandekerckhove & Eva E. Tsahuridu, Risky Rescues and the Duty to Blow the 
Whistle, 97 J. BUS. ETHICS 365, 370 (2010). 
 337. Dyck et al., supra note 30, at 2245. 
 338. Sawyer, supra note 302, at 2. 
 339. Dyck et al., supra note 30, at 2250. 
 340. Zingales, supra note 318, at 2. 
 341. Bowen et al., supra note 32, at 1241. 
 342. Id. at 1266. 
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whistleblower likely have difficulty identifying management as the 
cause of subsequent layoffs and are equally likely to blame the 
whistleblower for later negative performance of the firm.343 
In addition, co-employees of a whistleblower may believe that 
the whistleblower’s choice “condemns the [coworker]’s own 
behavior and . . . shakes the [coworker’s] confidence in being a 
good, moral person.”344 Even where whistleblowers do not explicitly 
condemn those who may have known of ongoing fraud and 
remained silent, the act of whistleblowing itself “should be perceived 
as an implied reproach against (and implicit rejection of) those not 
making the same choice.”345 
Given the tremendous personal, social, and economic costs of 
whistleblowing, why would anyone blow the whistle? For some, the 
answer might be that the ordinary meaning of social ostracism is 
reduced. That is to say, whistleblowers might be outcasts who have 
less to lose than others. Whistleblowers might be oddballs who do 
not value unity and psychological harmony to the same degree that 
ordinary employees do. Whistleblowers might even be insane, or at 
least not psychologically balanced. Of course, just because a 
whistleblower is crazy, that does not mean she has not spotted 
genuine and serious fraud. 
C. How Can Financial Bounties Change the Analysis? 
Prior to Dodd-Frank’s new provisions, financial rewards were 
available to whistleblowers in relatively few settings.346 The FCA, for 
instance, applies only to “the very few industries where the 
government is a significant buyer.”347 Dodd-Frank’s expansion of 
whistleblower bounties reflects a recognition that by increasing the 
“benefit side of the cost-benefit analysis” confronting a potential 
whistleblower, private individuals are more likely to come forward.348  
 
 
 343. Taylor & Curtis, supra note 277, at 22 (“[T]hose internal to the organization often 
view the whistleblower’s report (rather than the initial wrongdoing) as the cause of their 
losses.”). 
 344. Marquez, supra note 335, at 77. 
 345. Id. 
 346. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 41, at 1168 (“Rewards are not as prevalent as 
antiretaliation protections . . . .”). 
 347. Dyck et al., supra note 30, at 2246. 
 348. Gonzalez, supra note 62, at 339. 
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The “courageous few may need a little bit more of a push to stick 
their neck out.”349 
Empirical research on whistleblowing has indicated that financial 
incentives create a significant motivation to detect and report fraud, 
which is observable “regardless of the severity of the fraud.”350 
According to one study, in the health care industry, where federal 
payments under the FCA are available to whistleblowers, fraud was 
detected as a result of an inside tipster in forty-one percent of the 
cases, compared to just fourteen percent of the cases in all other 
industries where employees are less likely to be rewarded with 
whistleblower bounties.351 The presence of a “strong monetary 
incentive to blow the whistle does motivate people with information 
to come forward.”352  
The gains for whistleblowers under the FCA can be tremendous. 
Payouts may average as high as $46.7 million for successful qui tam 
relators.353 Qui tam cases take years to pursue, and the results can be 
uncertain, but the financial incentive appears to be “an important 
factor in leading the employee to talk.”354 In total, since the FCA 
was strengthened in 1986, the federal government has recovered 
nearly $16 billion in settlements and judgments, with nearly sixteen 
percent of the recovered funds “distributed to the individuals who 
helped bring the fraud to light.”355 
In economic terms, whistleblowers gamble their entire 
accumulated human capital investment against various potential 
gains—to their firm and self—of blowing the whistle. A 
whistleblower is unlikely to remain in her current position and is 
unlikely to be rehired to perform the same role for a different 
employer. As a result, an employee’s human capital investment 
associated with preparing for the particular position she holds 
disappears the moment she blows the whistle. For whistleblowing to 
make sense in a purely pecuniary calculus, the financial returns from 
whistleblowing must offset the lost human capital investment. If 
typical whistleblowers are mid-career middle managers, they have an 
 
 349. Id. 
 350. Dyck et al., supra note 30, at 2215. 
 351. Id. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. at 2215–16. 
 354. Id. at 2245. 
 355. Bowen et al., supra note 32, at 1246. 
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investment in human capital terms that could easily be in the 
hundreds of thousands of dollars. Back pay is likely inadequate to 
provide offsetting benefits because it does nothing to protect a 
whistleblower’s future prospects. However, the bounty scheme 
employed by the FCA, and potentially by Dodd-Frank, might 
provide a sufficient carrot to make the decision to blow the whistle 
more palatable. 
Whistleblower bounties in the financial fraud setting might be 
particularly effective given the relative sophistication and capitalist 
bent of financial industry employees. Unlike an FCA whistleblower, 
who might be a defense contractor engineer who is unfamiliar with 
the nuances of the Federal Acquisition Regulations,356 or a nurse not 
versed in the details of the Medicare reimbursement provisions,357 a 
financial fraud whistleblower is more likely to have some sort of 
finance or accounting training that enables her to comprehend, 
synthesize, and evaluate information that points to fraud. When 
properly calibrated, bounty schemes “encourage informants to 
gather information, analyze what they know, seek out additional 
documentation, and organize the information in a useful and 
comprehensible form.”358 Moreover, since “[p]eople in the financial 
industry are singularly motivated by wealth,”359 potential bounty 
rewards might mean more to them than to potential whistleblowers 
working in other sectors of the economy. 
 
 356. The Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) define the proper claims for 
reimbursement in government procurement contracts, and violations of the FAR are often the 
key component of an FCA case. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Dekort v. Integrated Coast Guard Sys., 
705 F. Supp. 2d 519, 537 n.5 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (defendant responding to engineer’s FCA 
case by arguing that plaintiff’s “allegations are inconsistent with the government’s contract 
formation rules under the Federal Acquisition Regulations”); U.S. ex rel. Whipple v. Rockwell 
Space Operations Co., No. CIV.A.H-96-3626, 2002 WL 864246, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 
2002) (rejecting engineer’s FCA claim because supposed fraud actually consisted of “allowable 
costs” under the Federal Acquisition Regulations). 
 357. See, e.g., Wagemann v. Doctor’s Hosp. of Slidell, LLC, No. 09-3506, 2010 WL 
3168087, at *7 (E.D. La. Aug. 6, 2010) (holding that a nurse’s allegations of Medicare 
overbilling failed due to inability to demonstrate that allegedly fraudulent activities increased 
the “fixed amount paid by Medicare”); U.S. v. Thorek Hosp., No. 04 C 8034, 2008 WL 
1883454, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2008) (holding that nurse’s “vague allegations” of 
Medicare overbilling failed because they did not establish submission of false claims for 
reimbursement to the government). The Medicare law has created “complex reimbursement 
schemes.” N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp. v. Wellcare of N.Y., Inc., No. 10 Civ. 6748(SAS), 
2011 WL 70565, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2011). 
 358. Barnard, supra note 155, at 414. 
 359. Id. at 411. 
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Another way that bounties incentivize reporting has less to do 
with whistleblowers themselves, and more to do with lawyers. Where 
bounties are available, plaintiffs’ counsel will represent and advocate 
on behalf of whistleblowers, and invest substantial sums investigating 
an alleged fraud in order to prepare potential bounty claims or cases. 
The plaintiff’s bar may also serve a valuable screening role by helping 
to weed out those cases that are unlikely to lead to successful 
enforcement action. Even if bounties have only a limited role in 
tipping the scale for a whistleblower, because they can stimulate the 
growth of an active plaintiff’s bar, they may profoundly impact the 
actual effect that whistleblowers are able to have. Where no bounties 
are available, whistleblowers may abandon their efforts to expose 
fraud, unassisted by counsel willing to advocate on their behalf. 
Several arguments have been raised against bounty awards. Some 
critics question their effectiveness.360 Others argue that bounties 
encourage frivolous claims361 or claims regarding ambiguous 
behavior that may or may not be fraud, and impose administrative 
costs on courts and agencies forced to oversee such programs. Critics 
also allege that bounties are morally corrupting.362 
Some empirical research has questioned the efficacy of bounty 
rewards in promoting whistleblowing. Most subjects in Yuval 
Feldman and Orly Lobel’s study indicated that whistleblowers would 
be motivated to speak up out of moral concern, not by financial 
bounties.363 Bounties most powerfully affected reporting in the 
experiments where moral concerns were absent.364 Where moral 
concerns were relatively low, small bounties actually decreased the 
likelihood individuals would blow the whistle.365 The authors 
speculate that low rewards might interfere with the relationship 
between the moral dimension of misconduct and the likelihood of 
 
 360. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 41, at 1202. 
 361.  See infra nn. 369–70 and accompanying text. 
 362.  See infra nn. 376–77 and accompanying text. 
 363. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 41, at 1202.  
 364. See id. 
 365. Id. at 1194 (“Respondents least likely to report were those offered a low reward 
while they had a low perception of misconduct severity. Reporting in those circumstances was 
even lower than situations where no incentive was present.”); id. at 1202 (“Most surprisingly, 
our experiment shows that where misconduct is expected to evoke a lower level of moral 
outrage, the introduction of small bounties may actually decrease the rate at which it is 
reported.”). 
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reporting.366 Perhaps low-level rewards are counterproductive 
because individuals perceive such rewards as likely to lead other 
employees to report wrongdoing first; as a result, potential 
whistleblowers may doubt whether coming forward themselves is 
necessary. Arguably, however, in the context of financial fraud the 
moral need to blow the whistle is less salient than in other settings, 
where the decision to remain silent could compromise health and 
safety of employees or customers. Indeed, there is considerable moral 
ambiguity surrounding corporate fraud—with white collar crime not 
widely perceived as a serious moral problem.367 For this reason, 
relatively large whistleblower bounties may be more useful in the 
financial fraud setting than in public safety contexts where the moral 
benefit of blowing the whistle is clear cut. 368 
Bounties might lead to frivolous instances of whistleblowing, 
with employees seeking lottery-sized payouts by pointing to 
imagined or concocted instances of fraud. It is possible that “large 
rewards could principally spur false or groundless claims,”369 and 
Jonathan Macey has speculated that where bounties are involved, 
“there are likely to be several false complaints for every valid one.”370 
Moreover, individuals can differ on “what actually constitutes illegal, 
immoral or illegitimate” business practices, and whistleblowers 
acting in good-faith could nevertheless “misinterpret[] a situation” 
in ways that could have lasting negative effects on firms.371 
Expanding the direct rewards for whistleblowing, as Dodd-Frank 
does, might “aggravate negative effects since one cannot preclude 
the incentive for individuals to blow the whistle for purely 
opportunistic reasons.”372 
However, the Dyck study provides contrary evidence, suggesting 
that the rate of frivolous claims by whistleblowers is lower in the 
health care industry, where FCA bounties have long been available, 
 
 366. Id. 
 367. Pamela H. Bucy, Moral Messengers: Delegating Prosecutorial Power, 59 SMU L. REV. 
321, 335 (2006) (noting that American society has an “ambivalent attitude toward white 
collar crime”). 
 368. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 41, at 1202 (“When the ethical significance attached 
to the reporting act is absent, the level of monetary compensation offered through the 
regulatory scheme is decisive.”). 
 369. Schmidt, supra note 270, at 158. 
 370. Macey, supra note 267, at 1937. 
 371. Schmidt, supra note 270, at 158. 
 372. Id. at 164. 
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than in other industries: “[T]here is no evidence that having stronger 
monetary incentives to blow the whistle leads to more frivolous 
suits.”373 Like the FCA, the Dodd-Frank bounty scheme requires 
whistleblowers to present fairly specific information about alleged 
fraud, and “[f]abricating such details would be difficult” and “a risky 
undertaking in light of the punishments and sanctions that often 
befall whistleblowers and the legal risks of engaging in perjury.”374 As 
a result, the “vexatious litigation and administrative expense 
criticisms” lodged against bounty programs are “largely 
overblown.”375 
Some critics have also argued that bounties are morally 
corrupting because they “monetize virtue.”376 By introducing 
“selfish motives for whistle-blowing,” the moral value of 
whistleblowing is arguably reduced.377 A similar argument has been 
lodged against imposing a duty to rescue in the common law of tort 
on the grounds that a financial obligation to rescue would cheapen 
the moral value of heroic service.378 
There are a number of responses to this “morally corrupting” 
argument. First, even if an individual’s motives for whistleblowing 
are selfish, that does not necessarily render the act of whistleblowing 
morally wrong.379 Where it serves the public good, the act of 
whistleblowing is morally right even if the “person who performs it is 
not virtuous or praiseworthy.”380 Second, financial incentives may be 
morally justified if they lead to fewer cases in which individuals make 
the morally wrong decision not to blow the whistle.381 A third 
objection to the argument is that individuals’ moral senses are 
“deep-seated, relatively unchangeable traits of character” that are 
unlikely to be negatively affected by the availability of such 
incentives.382 
 
 373. Dyck et al., supra note 30, at 2246. 
 374. Carson et al., supra note 154, at 369. 
 375. Gonzalez, supra note 62, at 340. 
 376. Barnard, supra note 155, at 413. 
 377. Carson et al., supra note 154, at 365. 
 378. See Vandekerckhove & Tsahuridu, supra note 336, at 374 (“Imposing a duty to 
rescue not only limits people’s autonomy but also removes morality and moral responsibility 
from the individual.”). 
 379. See Carson et al., supra note 154, at 366. 
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 381. Id. 
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Critics of bounty schemes also argue that such measures 
encourage external reporting and discourage “first reporting the 
problem internally to appropriate authorities.”383 However, the  
SEC’s final rules have taken some steps to address this concern in the 
Dodd-Frank context.384  
Finally, critics argue that bounties can raise administrative costs 
for enforcement agencies already overburdened with investigations 
and stressed by limited resources. The biggest objection to bounties 
for securities fraud tipsters is likely that the SEC “already receives 
more tips than it can reasonably handle.”385 To avoid making matters 
worse, implementation of a bounty scheme would have to be 
“preceded by the creation of a tip-handling system that is capable of 
recognizing the kinds of information that are worthy of further 
pursuit.”386 Fortunately, the SEC has created a new Office of Market 
Intelligence that may be up to the task.387 Of course, a true qui tam 
structure avoids some of the administrative burdens associated with 
whistleblowing by empowering private actors to pursue claims on 
behalf of the government. The qui tam structure also adds value by 
making an individual who is likely highly intelligent, motivated, and  
committed to uncovering the truth at the heart of a fraudulent 
scheme available to the investigating authorities.388 
Early indications are that the new program will lead to a sharp 
rise in tips provided to the SEC. In the aftermath of media coverage 
over the provision’s enactment, the SEC reported that “[t]ips from 
whistleblowers . . . have increased significantly.”389 Prior to Dodd-
Frank, the SEC received perhaps two dozen “high-value” tips per 
 
 383. Id. at 367. 
 384. See generally Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 
34,300, 34,300–01 (June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).  
 385. Barnard, supra note 155, at 412. 
 386. Id. at 410. 
 387. See id. The Office of Market Intelligence spent $21 million to develop a “Tips, 
Complaints and Referrals” (TCR) database. See Sarah N. Lynch & Matthew Goldstein, SEC 
Builds New Tips Machine to Catch the Next Madoff, REUTERS (July 27, 2011), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/27/us-sec-investigations-idUSTRE76Q2NY201 
10727. This database gives some 2,300 SEC employees access to tips, allowing them to check 
for whistleblower information in connection with potential investigations. The Office has also 
built a 41-member Market Intelligence Unit with an FBI special agent embedded in the team. 
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 388. Rapp, supra note 19, at 130. 
 389. Dave Clarke, SEC Gets More Whistleblower Tips, REUTERS (Feb. 4, 2011), 
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year; between July 2010 (when Dodd-Frank was signed into law) 
and February 2011, the SEC received as many as one to two high-
value tips per day.390 Notably, tips in the aftermath of Dodd-Frank 
have also been increasingly submitted by attorneys representing 
whistleblowers, rather than the tipsters themselves.391 As the 
program’s final rules take effect, the number of tips will surely rise.392 
Where the protection provided by SOX is uncertain, the 
potential to obtain a bounty may offset the career harm a 
whistleblower expects to suffer. For such individuals, the potential 
gains now available under the Dodd-Frank bounty provision might 
provide reason to go to the SEC in spite of the absence of protection 
from termination under SOX.  
V. PROGNOSIS FOR THE DODD-FRANK BOUNTY PROVISION 
This section takes a three-part approach to considering the likely 
effectiveness of the new Dodd-Frank law in regard to promoting 
whistleblowing and deterring corporate fraud. First, it considers the 
SEC’s past experience with whistleblower bounties. Second, it 
discusses the model for the Dodd-Frank scheme, the Internal 
Revenue Service’s (IRS) whistleblower program. Finally, it compares 
the Dodd-Frank approach to a true qui tam structure such as the one 
provided by the federal FCA. 
One possible way to gauge the likely impact of the Dodd-Frank 
bounty scheme would be to examine two sets of cases from the 
period prior to its enactment: successful OSHA investigations of 
wrongful termination claims involving SOX securities fraud 
whistleblowers393 and SEC enforcement actions spurred by 
 
 390. Id. But see Kaja Whitehouse, SEC Whistleblower Call Draws Few Tipsters, N.Y. POST, 
Feb. 22, 2011, http://tinyurl.com/72a85m2 (noting that 168 tips were received in the first 
6.5 months of the program’s existence—a rate of less than one per day). 
 391. Clarke, supra note 389. 
 392. Whitehouse, supra note 390. Some whistleblowers may have refrained from 
contacting the SEC out of a fear that the final rules will require internal reporting in order to 
claim a bounty. Id. 
 393. In the world of OSHA Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claims, the stories of successful 
SOX whistleblowers might provide a useful glimpse of the likely future impact of the Dodd-
Frank bounty scheme. Of course, even whistleblowers unsuccessful in SOX anti-retaliation 
claims before OSHA evaluators and Department of Labor ALJs might be successful in seeking 
bounties under the new law. Where the SOX whistleblower complaint was unsuccessful, it may 
have been due to the difficulty in establishing causation. Whistleblowers unable to gain 
protection from retaliation might still be entitled to bounties under Dodd-Frank where a 
successful SEC enforcement action was initiated. However, where OSHA or ALJ claims were 
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whistleblower tips. Imagining the application of the new rules to 
these anecdotes might shed light onto how the new provision is 
likely to shape the reporting of financial fraud. Unfortunately, there 
are simply too few well-documented cases to provide much insight 
on the effectiveness of the new provision. 
To date, successful OSHA whistleblowers tips have simply not 
spurred any SEC enforcement action, much less actions producing 
the required $1 million sanction. Under SOX, after a whistleblower 
files a complaint with OSHA, OSHA informs the SEC of the 
violation.394 Richard Moberly found that “[e]ven though the SEC 
receives summaries of whistleblower allegations filed with OSHA, 
the SEC has not publicly recommended that the Department of 
Justice investigate any person accused of retaliating against a 
whistleblower.”395 In response to congressional inquiry, the SEC 
explained that it intended to leave whistleblower enforcement to the 
Department of Labor.396 
One SOX whistleblower who obtained a favorable settlement 
after a positive OSHA investigation was JP Morgan’s Peter Sivere. 
The SEC had launched an investigation into JP Morgan’s mutual 
fund trading practices.397 In his role as a surveillance analyst, Sivere 
was tasked with retrieving e-mails to respond to an SEC subpoena. 
After uncovering one he deemed relevant, he contacted superiors, 
whom he believed took no action.398 He was removed from the 
project and subsequently took Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA) leave.399 After returning to work, he was eventually 
terminated. Before that occurred, however, Sivere forwarded various 
-emails to the SEC (from the AOL email address 
“bountyman04@aol.com”).400 The e-mails read, in part: 
 
successful, that suggests investigators found the most merit in complainant’s assertions that 
they engaged in “protected activity,” which may overlap with the new law’s definitions of 
“original information” and “voluntary disclosure.” 
 394. Moberly, supra note 43, at 79. 
 395. Id. at 148–49 (footnote omitted). 
 396. Id. at 149. 
 397. SEC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION, CASE NO. 
OIG-501, at 6 (2009), available at http://pogoarchives.org/m/fo/sec-oig-report-
20090330.pdf [hereinafter, SEC OIG]. The various documents contained in the SEC’s report 
use separate numbering systems, so as to aid the reader, the page numbers here will refer to the 
PDF page numbers rather than the page number listed on the individual item in the report. 
 398. Id.  
 399. Id. 
 400. Id. at 32. 
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---Original Message--- 
From:Bountyman04@aol.com  
Sent:Sunday, June 13, 2004, 10:05 AM 
To:ENFORCEMENT 
Subject:“Application for Award of Bounty” 
 
Commission: 
 
I am a Compliance Officer at a major broker dealer. I have in 
my possession, E-mails that may or may not be helpful to 
your examination of this broker dealer in connection with 
mutual fund transactions.401 
 
When he forwarded the e-mails to the SEC, Sivere initially 
requested a bounty,402 but at the time those were only authorized for 
insider trading cases.403 Sivere subsequently filed an OSHA SOX 
complaint.404 JP Morgan’s response, which Sivere eventually 
obtained via a FOIA request,405 made reference to conversations 
Sivere had with SEC investigators.406 Sivere thus learned that the 
SEC attorney he had spoken with—in violation of SEC policy—had 
revealed his name to counsel representing JP Morgan.407 A report 
from the SEC’s Office of Inspector General (SEC OIG) found that 
its attorney had revealed that information to a partner at Davis Polk 
and actively “encouraged” the use of the information in defense of 
the SOX OSHA complaint.408 JP Morgan eventually settled the 
OSHA complaint after OSHA issued a letter indicating that it had 
reasonable cause to believe a violation of SOX had occurred.409 There 
was apparently no SEC enforcement action triggered by Sivere’s tips; 
 
 401. Id. at 66. 
 402. Id. at 2. 
 403. See infra nn.428–39 & accompanying text. 
 404. SEC OIG, supra note 397, at 7. 
 405.  FOIA, the Freedom of Information Act, allows individuals to obtain access to 
previously unreleased governmental records. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2010). 
 406. SEC OIG, supra note 397, at 8. 
 407. Id. at 10–11. 
 408. Id. at 11. 
 409. Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Occupational Health & Safety Admin. to JP 
Morgan, available at http://www.complianceweek.com/s/documents/JPMorgan-
OSHA.pdf. 
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moreover, he might not have been deemed to be a “voluntary” 
source of information, since part of his job was to report to the SEC. 
Even though he was a successful SOX whistleblower, Dodd-Frank 
would likely have provided him no bounty. 
Another SOX claimant, George Fort, served as CFO of 
Tennessee Commerce Bancorp.410 He was terminated by the bank, 
he alleged, in “retaliation for raising numerous concerns relating to 
internal controls, insider trading, and other related matters.”411 Fort 
refused to sign a 2008 10K,412 expressing concerns about SOX 
compliance and other issues.413 The Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation received a letter from a “Concerned Depositor” that 
raised concerns similar to those voiced by Mr. Fort, and the 
company suspected he had sent that letter.414 He was terminated on 
May 5, 2008.415 After Fort filed an OSHA complaint, the 
Department of Labor (DOL) found “reasonable cause to believe 
[he] was unlawfully discharged” in violation of SOX.416 The District 
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee issued a temporary 
restraining order upholding the DOL determination.417 The Sixth 
Circuit issued a preliminary injunction at the bank’s request, staying 
the application of the OSHA order.418  
The defendant, in litigation, produced a letter supposedly sent by 
the SEC to Tennessee Commerce Bank on December 3, 2009, 
indicating that it would “not recommend any enforcement actions” 
against the bank “as a result of Complainant’s concerns.”419 
 
 410. U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle Dist. of Tenn., Tennessee Commerce Bank 
Ordered to Reinstate Chief Financial Officer, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (May 20, 2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/tnm/pressReleases/2010/5-20-10.html.  
 411.  Id. 
 412. A 10K is the annual report required by the SEC for domestic issuers of securities. See 
Form 10-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (June 26, 2009), 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/form10k.htm. 
 413. Solis v. Tenn. Commerce Bancorp., Inc., 713 F. Supp. 2d 701, 706 (M.D. Tenn. 
2010). 
 414. Id. at 707. 
 415. Id. 
 416. Id. at 703. 
 417. Id. at 717. 
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However, no such letter appears in the Westlaw database of no-
action letters. Fort’s complaint was eventually dismissed with 
prejudice, presumably because of a settlement by the parties.420 
Again, the lack of an SEC action would have meant that no bounty 
was paid. 
A second source of insight into the fate of potential Dodd-Frank 
bounty claimants might be the recent SEC investigations launched as 
a result of whistleblower tips. Perhaps the best known recent SEC 
investigation launched as a result of whistleblower tips, at least in 
part, relates to the Ponzi scheme orchestrated by financier Bernie 
Madoff. That story has been discussed in detail in articles by other 
authors.421 
Another SEC investigation triggered by a whistleblower was of 
Citigroup Asset Management (“CAM”), a Citigroup and Smith 
Barney business venture that provides advisory and management 
services to investment funds.422 CAM initially used a “transfer 
agent,” First Data, but then, in the late 1990s created a subsidiary 
called Citicorp Trust Bank (“CTB”) that took on the responsibilities 
of transfer agent but actually farmed the bulk of the work to First 
Data at a reduced fee while keeping a substantial share of the fees.423 
In effect, investor funds were pocketed by CAM, which was charged 
with managing those funds.424 
The SEC received a whistleblower tip in September 2003 
regarding the failure of CAM to disclose the arrangements to the 
boards of the funds managed by CAM. As the result of an 
investigation, the defendants agreed to pay more than $200 million 
in fines.425 While this would certainly meet the minimum sanction 
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level to trigger a bounty under Dodd-Frank had the statute been in 
place, the record contains no real information about the identity of 
the whistleblowers. Whether they would have been eligible under the 
new provision is therefore a mystery. 
A. Comparison to Previous SEC Authority to Pay Insider Trading 
Bounties 
The SEC was granted the authority to pay whistleblowers in 
insider trading cases by the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Act 
of 1988.426 Between 1988 and 2010, the SEC “had paid out less 
than $160,000 in total to only five whistleblowers.”427 The SEC’s 
previous experience with bounties has indicated “the unsuccessful 
and unappealing features of would-be reward systems”428 managed 
by the Commission. In the past, the SEC has “shown little or no 
interest in whistleblower claims.”429 
Under the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Act, the SEC 
was given “sole discretion” to determine “whether, to whom, or in 
what amounts to make payments,” and the decision not to make a 
payment was “not subject to judicial review.”430 What may be open 
to debate, then, is whether the SEC’s former whistleblower program 
had any effect in terms of producing “speedy resolution of cases of 
corporate fraud or materially false financial statements.”431 For a 
potential bounty-seeker, there was simply no certainty that any 
payment would be made.432 Even where the SEC brought a 
successful enforcement action, informants had no guarantee of a 
bounty.433 
In administering the program, the SEC’s Enforcement Division 
has demonstrated “antipathy towards paying such bounties.”434 As a 
result, the SEC bounty program has not been widely utilized.435 
Moreover, there is “scant evidence” that the payouts had any 
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noticeable effect on the incidence of insider trading.436 
The insider trading bounty provisions were repealed with the 
enactment of Dodd-Frank, which subsumed the former program 
applicable only to insider trading cases.437 However, the SEC’s poor 
record under the prior program does make one doubtful about how 
successful the Commission will be in implementing the new Dodd-
Frank bounty scheme. 
B. Comparison to IRS Authority to Pay Tax Fraud Tipsters 
The IRS has long had the authority to pay awards to individuals 
who report tax cheats, although prior to 2006, such awards were 
discretionary.438 “[T]he IRS has been highly conservative in 
providing rewards to informants.”439 As a result, the IRS program 
was historically underutilized.440 The IRS rewarded bounties to only 
about eight percent of informants and returned only three to six 
percent of recovered funds to whistleblowers.441 
After 2006, however, the Internal Revenue Code442 was 
amended to make such bounty awards mandatory in certain 
circumstances.443 The new law also “significantly increase[d] the 
financial rewards paid to informants in high value cases and create[d] 
a separate Whistleblower Office within the IRS.”444 The IRS has now 
“collected hundreds of millions of dollars in unpaid taxes based on 
information received from informants under its bounty program.”445 
Under the 2006 amendments, whistleblowers are eligible for the 
maximum award from the IRS only if they reveal information on tax 
fraud amounting to at least $2 million by individuals with incomes 
greater than $200,000.446 Whistleblowers are entitled to bounties 
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only where the information “substantially contribute[d] to a decision 
to take administrative or judicial action that results in the collection 
of a tax.”447 Where these income and disputed amount thresholds are 
satisfied, an award is mandatory and whistleblowers collect between 
fifteen and thirty percent of the payments made by the tax cheat.448 
Informants can also “appeal the amount or denial of a reward in the 
U.S. Tax Court.”449 Claims for bounties involving taxpayers with 
lower incomes or involving lesser disputed amounts are still subject 
to the IRS’s discretion (that is, bounties are not mandatory), and 
maximum payouts are generally limited in such cases to no more 
than fifteen percent of recovered amounts.450  
Like Dodd-Frank, the IRS program imposes floors, both in 
terms of the disputed amount and the income of the target of the 
whistleblower’s allegations, before an award is mandatory. Unlike 
Dodd-Frank, however, the IRS program does not explicitly link 
these floors to any particular recovery by the federal government—
instead, they are linked to the disputed tax liability. This is a critical 
distinction between the IRS program and Dodd-Frank. Under 
Dodd-Frank, the minimum floors have nothing to do with the level 
of fraud; under the IRS program, they are linked to the level of 
fraud. Moreover, settlement negotiations between a tax cheat and 
the government that produce a relatively small payment on the 
disputed amount will not affect whether a whistleblower can claim a 
bounty, only the amount of the bounty paid. Another difference 
between the IRS program and Dodd-Frank, addressed by part of the 
proposal advanced in the next section of this Article, is that the IRS 
has discretion to pay awards even in cases involving instances of fraud 
that are below the statutory thresholds. 
The revamped IRS program was the model for Dodd-Frank,451 
but its success has been mixed. The IRS published its most recent 
required annual report on its whistleblower program in July 2011.452 
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Even though the number of tips doubled in the year reviewed 
(2010), the IRS actually paid out fewer awards than it had in the year 
before, and half as many as in 2008.453 The IRS was circumspect 
regarding the reasons behind the decline. The report stated that 
“[t]he number and amount of awards paid each year can vary 
significantly,” but provided only one explanation—a change in the 
timing of payouts so that whistleblowers were not paid until the 
period for appealing a tax-case determination had run, even in cases 
where no appeal had yet been filed.454 
C. Comparison to False Claims Act Bounty Model 
The FCA was enacted in 1863 “to reduce the incidence of fraud 
among the suppliers of munitions and other war materials to the 
Union government during the Civil War.”455 The FCA was subject 
to “far-reaching amendments” in 1986, which “made [the FCA] an 
attractive weapon to combat fraud in virtually any program involving 
federal funds.”456 “The Act called on private persons to bring to 
justice those defrauding the government by bringing ‘qui tam’ suits 
against the perpetrators.”457 
Qui tam complaints are filed under seal with the Department of 
Justice, which is given the option to intervene in the case.458 Of the 
4294 cases filed between 1987 and the end of 2003, the government 
declined to intervene in fully sixty-two percent of the cases.459 (The 
government “declined to intervene in 2653 cases” and intervened, or 
otherwise pursued, in 750, while 891 cases remained under 
investigation.)460 Where the government declines to intervene, a 
whistleblower can proceed with the case alone—and will typically 
receive a higher percentage of the government’s damages to reflect 
the additional burden placed on a private plaintiff.461  
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Even where the government declines to intervene, it retains the 
right to intervene at a later date and even to settle or seek dismissal 
of the qui tam case over a whistleblower’s objection.462  
Many of the features of the new Dodd-Frank whistleblower 
bounty provision have rightly been subject to criticism. The level of 
bounty likely may be too small to stimulate whistleblowing in serious 
cases. Like the SEC’s failed whistleblower bounty for insider trading, 
Dodd-Frank limits recovery to a percentage of fines levied in 
enforcement actions, rather than a share of the underlying fraud 
available to a FCA whistleblower.463 This may mitigate to some 
degree the salience of financial rewards. Experimental research by 
Yuval Feldman and Orly Lobel suggests that low expected bounty 
awards may actually be counterproductive, triggering less reporting 
than anti-retaliation protections or measures aimed at “triggering 
internal motivations of potential reporting individuals.”464 Similarly, 
the exclusion of certain potential whistleblowers—such as those with 
existing legal duties—and the procedural hurdles involved in the 
SEC’s rules may limit the statute’s effectiveness. These criticisms, 
however, are directed more at how the statute is calibrated—that is, 
the precise choices made in the whistleblowing rules—and less at the 
core design of the Dodd-Frank bounty scheme. 
The more serious problem with Dodd-Frank is that it does not 
vest whistleblowers with standing to pursue their claims against 
fraudsters directly. Instead, the SEC remains a gatekeeper for, and 
potential roadblock to, potential investigations. There are two 
reasons why the absence of qui tam structures may undercut the 
statute’s effectiveness. First, the SEC may continue to be 
unresponsive to whistleblower tips, with reporting leading to 
relatively little enforcement action. A qui tam structure would 
provide a sort of escape valve, under which a whistleblower could 
pursue a claim—and a bounty—even if the SEC remains inactive. 
Second, the qui tam structure provides a greater possibility that a 
whistleblower’s complaints will be resolved in an open, public forum. 
To the extent that nonmonetary incentives play a role in motivating 
whistleblowing, Dodd-Frank’s structure may be a poor policy choice 
precisely because it leaves resolution of cases solely in the hands of 
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the SEC, which has a history of preferring settlements over open 
enforcement proceedings.465 
1. Dodd-Frank bounties do not prevent the SEC from remaining a 
roadblock to tipsters.  
The possibility of financial reward is just one of the mechanisms 
that makes the FCA successful. The second is what has been called 
the “dual-plaintiff” aspect of the FCA.466 Even if the government 
decides not to intervene, whistleblowers can pursue their claims. This 
provides “powerful quality control” and “a way for knowledgeable 
and helpful insiders to work hand-in-hand with regulators lending 
expertise and resources” to the government.467 In a true qui tam 
structure, private persons “are not required to obtain permission or 
clearance of any sort before suing”; rather, “[t]hey alone decide 
who, what, how, and whether to charge a defendant.”468 
The absence of true qui tam structures also renders the new 
bounty scheme vulnerable to the same “systematic breakdowns” that 
prevented the SEC from identifying Bernie Madoff’s fraudulent 
Ponzi scheme.469 Even though tipsters had pressed the issue for a 
decade,470 the SEC failed to act.471 Had a qui tam option been 
available to whistleblowers, investigations could have proceeded even 
after the government declined to intervene. In fact, whistleblower 
Markopolos mistakenly believed he would be eligible for a bounty.472 
While Dodd-Frank’s realization of bounty options would have made 
that prospect realistic, the tremendous delay occasioned by the 
SEC’s failure to intervene allowed Madoff’s fraudulent scheme to 
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spiral to unparalleled magnitude.473 Markopolos’s experience 
demonstrates how meaningful private actions could be to 
“supplement SEC enforcement efforts and other failed corporate 
governance mechanisms.”474  
While some have suggested that the Markopolos debacle “will be 
avoided” through the creation of a bounty scheme,475 without the 
availability of a true qui tam vehicle, this suggestion is open to 
question. 
There are four reasons why the SEC is likely to remain a 
roadblock to whistleblowers seeking bounties under the new law. 
First, the SEC will continue to face resource limitations in enforcing 
the program. Second, the dual responsibility for whistleblowers now 
in effect (with the DOL reviewing SOX retaliation claims and the 
SEC reviewing claims for bounties) may result in relatively less 
regulatory attention from both agencies. Third, the SEC has long 
been plagued by allegations of “regulatory capture” by industry. 
Fourth, the SEC may continue to view whistleblower programs with 
distaste because they represent an implicit challenge to the regulatory 
Agency’s effectiveness. 
The first problem facing the SEC in administering the new 
program involves resource limitations. Dodd-Frank significantly 
expanded the SEC’s budget.476 While the SEC immediately began 
planning to spend these funds, budget negotiations have stalled the 
infusion of such resources.477 Moreover, the SEC was underfunded 
before Dodd-Frank,478 and the new burdens the Agency acquired 
under Dodd-Frank, which extend well beyond the area of 
whistleblower bounties, mean that the Agency will continue to face 
resource shortfalls. Were the SEC to have genuine bargaining power 
to set its budget, a “remotely realistic figure” would probably be 
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many times its current level of funding.479 At best, the SEC will 
pursue only a small selection of tips received due to its staffing 
limitations.480 The SEC is forced to make “hard choices about the 
optimal use of its resources to enforce the securities laws,”481 and it is 
likely that those hard choices will leave many whistleblowers 
ineligible for bounties. 
The second problem is that the new law creates a bifurcated 
regulatory structure for a typical whistleblower who has been the 
victim of retaliation. Such individuals might choose to both file an 
OSHA claim to address their retaliation damages and also file 
appropriate paperwork with the SEC to claim a bounty for reporting 
fraud. Where multiple regulatory agencies have responsibility for the 
same claims, it is possible that “issues of concern will fall between the 
jurisdictional cracks of separate regulators or be the subject of ‘turf 
battles’ between agencies.”482 Of course, overlapping agency 
responsibility can have some advantages, such as putting “more cops 
on the beat” and raising the costs for an industry that is attempting 
to “capture” regulators.483 Still, where neither agency is given 
primary responsibility—which seems to be the case in connection 
with SOX and Dodd-Frank—a risk emerges that neither agency will 
be active, because both believe “that the other agency will take the 
lead or pick up any slack.”484 Where one agency is solely responsible 
for enforcement “it is more likely to be diligent in pursuing that task 
because it knows it will be accountable for any failures.”485 In some 
contexts, competition between agencies can also be useful, with each 
trying to best the other in enforcement.486 Given OSHA’s historical 
problems in enforcing its whistleblower regulations, and the SEC’s 
reticence about the value of insider tips, however, there is little 
likelihood of virtuous competition emerging in the protection and 
reward of SOX/Dodd-Frank whistleblowers. 
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Third, the SEC may continue to be the victim of regulatory 
capture. Regulatory capture describes the tendency of regulatory 
agencies to suffer from a “persistent policy bias” in favor of 
“regulated or client interests.”487 The industries subject to a 
particular agency’s regulation are “well-financed and well-organized, 
especially when compared to the general public and public interest 
groups.”488 They can lobby agencies effectively and put pressure on 
the legislative committees responsible for setting agency budgets, 
which in turn can circumscribe agencies’ ability to engage in 
aggressive regulation.489 Agency employees “anticipate entering or 
returning to employment with the regulated industry once their 
government service terminates” and fear making enemies in the 
industry that might close the proverbial “revolving door.”490 The 
“logical (and most lucrative) job path” for SEC employees “is to 
move into compliance and other roles at investment banks, law firms, 
and large public company issuers after a few years of work at the 
SEC.”491 Regulated industries also have an information advantage 
over agencies, which are dependent on industry to provide 
information about “how the industry works and what it is capable of 
doing.”492  
Even after the increased attention it has received in the aftermath 
of the financial scandals of the past fifteen years, the SEC has not 
remedied policies and practices that create significant dangers of 
agency capture.493 Although all agencies “will succumb to ‘capture’ 
by special’ interest groups[,] . . . . [w]hat may be different about the 
SEC is the fact that with the Commission in recent years, this sort of 
behavior has not been simply random or opportunistic, but has been 
a defining characteristic feature of the SEC.”494 Perhaps the most 
striking evidence of SEC capture came in connection with an 
investigation launched by a whistleblower tip. As noted earlier, Peter 
Sivere, the former analyst at JP Morgan, had provided e-mails to the 
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SEC’s New York Regional Office concerning an ongoing 
investigation into his investment firm’s market timing.495 An SEC 
attorney disclosed the fact that Sivere had provided information to 
the SEC and requested a bounty (then only available in insider 
trading cases) to JP Morgan’s outside counsel.496 This clearly reflects 
capture of relevant SEC employees by the regulated industry (or, to 
be specific, the gatekeepers of the industry, which is to say its 
attorneys). Future whistleblowers may also encounter SEC 
employees more loyal to the firms the Commission regulates than to 
the notion that tipsters may have valuable information about fraud. 
Finally, in a sense, the emergence of a whistleblower is a 
challenge to the legitimacy of a regulator.497 Information about fraud 
coming from a whistleblower can suggest that regulators are not 
effectively monitoring their subject industry.498 Whistleblowers 
become competitors of the regulatory authorities; as a result, 
regulators tend to be unresponsive to whistleblower complaints.499 A 
qui tam vehicle recognizes that whistleblowers’ uneasy partnership, 
and sometimes outright competition, with regulators can be 
leveraged for policy gain. 
 
2. Dodd-Frank bounties do nothing to motivate whistleblowers in 
nonfinancial ways  
If whistleblowers are motivated not by money, but instead by 
do-gooder-ism and the desire to have their voices heard, then 
monetary incentives may offer a less concrete additional benefit. 
Instead, what whistleblowers are likely seeking is a day in court. 
Whistleblowers “have a strong sense of injustice” and “feel 
victimized and often desire to have the employer make a public 
apology.”500 Whistleblowers are often reluctant to settle their cases 
when forced to negotiate with a team of strangers.501 Working with 
outsiders “can increase a whistleblower’s feelings of persecution and  
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injustice.”502 Before a case can be resolved, whistleblowers want the 
chance to vent their emotions.503 
Dodd-Frank provides bounties, but because of the absence of a 
true qui tam provision, it does not guarantee a whistleblower that 
her allegations will ever be heard in an open forum. Indeed, since 
securities enforcement typically ends in settlement discussions rather 
than trial, whistleblowers under the Dodd-Frank scheme have no 
reason to expect the kind of public vindication that a successful qui 
tam action can provide to FCA relators. Qui tam lawsuits help 
restore “both moral and pragmatic legitimacy to the 
whistleblower.”504 The lawsuit gives a whistleblower the chance to 
fight for her legitimacy, and successful recovery helps vindicate a 
whistleblower’s claims and her actions.505 Litigation provides an 
“outlet for plaintiffs to voice their concerns” and “assert their right 
to be heard,”506 something not provided for whistleblowers when the 
SEC settles or declines to pursue their claims. Plaintiffs “often feel a 
need to have their story told to experience the catharsis this 
produces.”507 The decision to blow the whistle is an “important part 
of their lives,”508 if not a singular one, and the chance to tell the 
story is not guaranteed in the Dodd-Frank process. There is simply 
“no way to heal emotionally from an injury if the story goes unheard 
and victims are denied their moral right to testify to their own 
pain.”509 
Given its historical role as a roadblock to whistleblowers, the 
SEC is not likely to be seen as an ally for a whistleblower seeking 
vindication and a chance to tell her story. Whistleblowers may lack 
trust in the Dodd-Frank process, and promoting trust is one of the 
key ways to foster reporting.510 A true qui tam structure would have 
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fostered trust by assuring potential whistleblowers that their 
allegations would eventually be processed in a judicial forum.  
Similarly, where whistleblowers are motivated by revenge, money 
is unlikely to make a significant difference. In the context of tax 
fraud whistleblowing, many of those reporting fraud are ex-spouses 
of alleged tax cheats.511 While money might add some sweetness to 
the act of blowing the whistle, the underlying goal of such 
whistleblowers is to put their targets through the wringer. Qui tam 
provides whistleblowers a vehicle for asking questions, sometimes 
probing and intrusive, of their targets. For revenge-motivated 
whistleblowers, the new Dodd-Frank law provides no such 
opportunity. 
Qui tam plaintiffs are also more likely than Dodd-Frank 
whistleblowers to remain vested in the process. To the extent that 
perseverance matters in measuring whether whistleblowing is 
effective, a qui tam structure maximizes perseverance by giving the 
whistleblower significant ownership of the investigation and 
enforcement of antifraud provisions. Qui tam whistleblowers have “a 
much greater stake in the claim because they must fund the litigation 
(unless the DOJ takes over the prosecution), they must bear the 
costs if unsuccessful, and they stand to reap a much greater reward if 
the proceeds of the action are large.”512 Moreover, attorneys 
representing qui tam plaintiffs will target large, “deep-pocketed” 
defendants, and it is arguably fraud in connection with those 
defendants that presents the greatest risk of harm to the financial 
system.513 
Albert O. Hirschman’s work on the sociology of dissent514 
provides a useful vehicle for understanding the value of qui tam 
actions. Dissenters have three choices with respect to failing 
 
 511. Daily Mail Reporter, ‘Encourage Others to Squeal’: IRS Awards $4.5m to Accountant 
after Tip Off in First Ever Whistleblower Award, DAILY MAIL (LONDON), Apr. 8, 2011, 
http://tinyurl.com/7z33s2r (“Many of the tips involved mom-and-pop operations or ex-
spouses.”); Robert Goulder, Gambling on IRS Whistleblower Payouts, TAX.COM (Jun. 10, 
2010, 12:31 PM) http://www.tax.com/taxcom/taxblog.nsf/Permalink/RGOR-
85VPF5?OpenDocument (“In other cases the informant might be a disgruntled business 
partner or ex-spouse.”). 
 512. Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Private Enforcement of Systemic Risk Regulation, 43 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 993, 1014 (2011). 
 513. Id.  
 514. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE & LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN 
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES (1970). 
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institutions. They can “elect to leave that organization for another 
(exit),” they can “express their dissent through complaint . . . 
(voice),” or they can “decline to act (loyalty).”515 The last option—
loyalty and silence—is one that whistleblowers decline the minute 
they raise their complaints, either within or outside of a firm. The 
exit option is the one most served by the financial aspects of 
whistleblower bounties. Since a potential bounty offsets the costs of 
blowing the whistle, it allows a whistleblower to exit an organization 
without a significant loss in human capital investment. However, the 
qui tam structure provides “voice” in a way that Dodd-Frank does 
not. In qui tam, the whistleblower is empowered to pursue the 
litigation himself or herself. In that process, the whistleblower is 
given a chance to express her dissent against the organization’s 
fraudulent scheme in a very public and very real way. By contrast, 
under Dodd-Frank, the SEC can become a bottleneck for 
expression, and whistleblowers’ allegations have no guarantee that 
they will ever see a courtroom. 
There would certainly be downsides to expanding relator actions 
to the financial fraud context. Expansion would produce “a 
significant amount of new litigation and attorney fee awards.”516 A 
sensibly designed policy would provide moderate awards but enable  
at least some private pursuit of securities enforcement by 
whistleblowers so as to support those with nonfinancial motivations. 
VI. ALTERNATIVES: TOWARD AN INFORMER’S ACTION FOR SOX 
WHISTLEBLOWERS 
This Article has cast doubt on the likelihood that Dodd-Frank’s 
whistleblower bounty provisions will change the realities of Wall 
Street fraud, given that the statute fails to embrace a true qui tam 
structure. This section advances a two-part palliative for the flaws of 
Dodd-Frank. The two main flaws of the scheme revealed in this 
Article are (1) its limitation to enforcement actions producing at 
least $1 million in sanctions and (2) the absence of a qui tam 
mechanism for private whistleblowers to pursue claims when the 
SEC declines to take any action whatsoever. Several steps could be  
 
 
 515. Ronald J. Daniels et al., The Legacy of Empire: The Common Law Inheritance and 
Commitments to Legality in Former British Colonies, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 111, 125 (2011). 
 516. Arnold, supra note 10, at 468. 
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taken to address these limitations of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower 
program.  
A. Bounties Should Be Available in Low- or No-Sanction Cases 
First, the SEC should be permitted to pay bounties even in cases 
in which no monetary sanction is imposed, such as where a cease-
and-desist order, obey-the-law injunction, or therapeutic reform is 
employed. Similarly, the SEC’s discretion should extend, as the IRS’s 
does, to paying bounties in cases below Dodd-Frank’s $1 million 
threshold. Second, a qui tam structure should be developed for those 
cases in which the SEC declines (or fails) to take any action. In past 
work, I have argued that bounties could be paid by way of traditional 
qui tam cases brought in the securities fraud context under state 
whistleblower laws (based on state government investments in 
publically traded companies) or by using the federal FCA (in the case 
of companies receiving investments as part of the federal bailout 
programs).517 In addition to providing bounties, both of those 
approaches would create qui tam structures for whistleblowers to 
proceed regardless of SEC inaction. Rather than revisit those 
proposals, this section suggests an additional model for 
consideration, the qui tam provisions of the False Marking Act.518 
 
The first fix, giving the SEC discretion to pay bounties even in 
cases in which no monetary sanction is obtained or in which the $1 
million threshold is not met, is relatively straightforward. Such a 
change could be made in statutory text taking the following form: 
 
DISCRETION TO PAY BOUNTIES WHERE NO OR LITTLE 
MONETARY SANCTION IS IMPOSED— 
 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.) 
is amended by inserting after Section 21F(a)(C)(2)  
 
(3) DISCRETION TO PAY BOUNTIES IN JUDICIAL OR 
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS THAT ARE NOT COVERED 
PROCEEDINGS. —In any action by the SEC in which the 
 
 517. Rapp, supra note 21. 
 518. More accurately, the qui tam provisions of the patent False Marking Act prior to the 
changes effected by the America Invents Act of 2011. 
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monetary sanctions imposed in a covered action or related 
action are less than $1 million, or in any action producing no 
monetary sanction but instead a nonmonetary sanction such 
as a cease-and-desist order, injunction, disbarment, or other 
civil remedy or criminal sanction, the SEC shall have 
discretion to pay a bounty, not to exceed $300,000, to a 
whistleblower who voluntarily provided original information 
to the Commission that led to the successful enforcement of 
the action. The SEC’s decision not to pay a bounty in such 
cases, or of the amount of the bounty, shall not be subject to 
appeal. 
 
Unfortunately, there is no realistic alternative in designing a 
bounty reward for small- or no-sanction cases other than to vest 
discretion over paying such awards to the SEC. In cases where no 
monetary sanction or disgorgement remedy is imposed, there would 
be no rubric against which to apply a fixed-share bounty. The 
$300,000 maximum is thirty percent of a bounty meeting the 
minimum enforcement sanction level of $1 million. The proposed 
language here recognizes that the SEC often may choose to impose 
purely nonmonetary sanctions in cases that were spurred by a 
whistleblower, but still provides whistleblowers with a reward for 
bringing fraud to light.  
One of the reasons to include such cases in the whistleblower 
bounty scheme is that corporate penalties are not appropriate in 
most cases unless shareholders have improperly benefitted from the 
violation.519 Corporate fines are paid (indirectly) by shareholders, 
who are, perversely, the victims of most securities fraud.520 For that 
reason, in many instances policy favors sanctions that are 
nonmonetary in nature. Dodd-Frank should not ignore the 
importance of such actions in deterring securities fraud nor the role 
that whistleblowers can play in promoting successful actions seeking 
nonmonetary sanctions. 
B. Whistleblowers Should Be Given Standing to Pursue Fraud Claims 
Independent of the SEC 
The second aspect of this Article’s proposed fix for Dodd-Frank’s 
 
 519. Black, supra note 136, at 324–25. 
 520. Id. 
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flaws is to develop a structure allowing whistleblowers to proceed 
with an investigation and litigation even where the SEC takes no 
enforcement action at all. In Dodd-Frank, Congress directed the 
SEC to conduct a study evaluating whether “it would be useful for 
Congress to consider empowering whistleblowers . . . who have 
already attempted to pursue the case through the Commission, to 
have a private right of action . . . on behalf of the Government and 
themselves, against persons who have committee [sic] securities 
fraud.”521 This Article lays the foundation for such congressional 
enactment. 
To be sure, there would be some practical difficulties associated 
with crafting a qui tam mechanism for SOX whistleblowers. Unlike 
in the FCA, where an injury to the government provides the basis for 
calculating a relator’s award, in the Dodd-Frank whistleblower 
setting, the civil “fine” is not awarded as compensation for injury to 
the government. Nor are some other models of private enforcement 
of regulatory regimes all that applicable, such as those available in the 
environmental law setting. While fines may be levied in such actions, 
citizen plaintiffs are ineligible to share in those sanctions.522  
Thus, I propose the creation of an “Informer’s Act” for securities 
fraud whistleblowers to supplement the new Dodd-Frank bounty 
scheme. An Informer’s Act differs from a traditional qui tam suit in 
that an Informer “may be empowered” to do more than 
“recover . . . sums owed the government”523 by seeking fines on 
behalf of the government. Standing issues would likely mean that the 
plaintiff in an Informer’s Action would not be able to obtain 
injunctive relief or a declaratory judgment;524 however, since the SEC 
has the option to pursue cases based on tips from Dodd-Frank 
informants, and the Informer’s Act proposed here would only be 
triggered when the SEC declines to do so, the loss of such remedies 
should not be a major concern. Moreover, the proposal here 
provides, as does the FCA, for subsequent intervention by the SEC 
should it experience a change of heart and wish to seek such 
remedies. 
 
 521. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 12, § 922(d)(1)(G). 
 522. Patti Goldman, Public Interest Environmental Litigation in China: Lessons Learned 
from the U.S. Experience, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 251, 269 & n.102 (2007). 
 523. Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. REV. 
159, 198 (2011). 
 524. Id. at 199–200. 
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There is some recent precedent for permitting private citizens to 
sue for civil fines under an Informer’s Act framework. Under the 
Patent Act, false marking of goods with counterfeit or imitation 
patent marks triggers a $500 per violation fine.525 A defendant must 
have marked a product either with an expired patent or a patent that 
does not actually cover the product and must have done so with the 
purpose of deceiving the public.526  
For a time, “[a]ny person” was authorized by the Patent Act to 
file a lawsuit seeking statutory penalties, with one half of the 
proceeds going to the qui tam plaintiff and the other half to the 
United States.527 That provision was eliminated in legislation passed 
by the House and Senate in the summer of 2011,528 but during its 
existence it did offer a model for a private informer’s action in the 
securities fraud context. Until the 2011 changes, the plaintiff did not 
need to be a competitor or have sustained an injury to bring an 
action under the statute. This form of action is “much more like an 
informer’s action (where the plaintiff is a private prosecutor) than a 
qui tam action, since the plaintiff here would be suing a lawbreaker, 
not someone who defrauded the government.”529 In the 2011 Act, 
only the United States or an injured competitor can bring suit, and 
in the case of the latter, only the damages suffered would be 
available.530 
The False Marking Statute had been on the books for more than 
a century and a half and “remains one of only a handful of qui tam 
actions left intact from a rich history of varied incentives provided by 
the government for private enforcement.”531 However, the statute 
 
 525. 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2006). Legislation introduced in 2010, H.R. 4954, 111th Cong. 
(2010), and H.R. 6352, 111th Cong. (2010), would have added a requirement of individual 
damage and thus end the qui tam patent mismarking claim. Neither of these bills made 
significant legislative progress. H.R. 4954 and H.R. 6352 were referred to the House Judiciary 
Committee, but neither was reported by the Committee or enacted into law. See H.R. 4954: To 
Amend Title 35, United States Code, to Provide Recourse Under the Patent Law, GOVTRACK.US, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-4954 (last visited Nov. 10, 2011); 
H.R. 6352: Patent Lawsuit Reform Act of 2010, GOVTRACK.US, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-6352 (last visited Nov. 10, 2011).  
 526. Kirsten R. Rydstrom et al., Burning Down the Courthouse: Qui Tam Actions Under 
Section 292 of the False Marking Statute, U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y, Spring 2011, at 1, 2. 
 527. 35 U.S.C. § 292(b). 
 528. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 529. Elliott, supra note 523, at 202 n.269. 
 530. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 16(b). 
 531. Winston, supra note 25, at 111.  
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was not widely used until the Federal Circuit recently held that the 
$500 penalty applied per article sold.532 This decision unleashed “a 
firestorm of patent mismarking claims.”533 Some worried that this 
could lead to “a new ‘cottage industry’ of false-marking litigation 
brought by ‘marking trolls’ who have not suffered any direct harm 
but who stand to collect potentially massive damage awards based on 
the number of articles a company places into commerce with a false 
marking on them.”534 In practice, relator-plaintiffs in the false 
marking context face difficulty establishing the necessary intent to 
deceive.535 However, were a similar statute created in the securities 
fraud context, the status of whistleblowers as insiders might give 
them greater access to relevant information, which would make it 
easier to prove intent to deceive. 
The False Marking Act precedent provides a basis for creating an 
Informer’s Action for SOX/Dodd-Frank whistleblowers. Such 
Informer’s Actions have a storied history—they existed in colonial 
and post-colonial times, when “a member of the public could sue to 
ensure government agent compliance with the law, and receive a 
bounty” when successful.536 The proposal here, modeled after the 
FCA, provides such an Informer’s Action (referred to as a “Relator’s 
Enforcement Action”) to securities fraud whistleblowers: 
 
SECURITIES WHISTLEBLOWER RELATOR’S ENFORCEMENT 
ACTION— 
 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.) 
is amended by inserting after Section 21F(e) 
 
 
 532. S. Edward Sarskas & Melissa H. Burkland, False Patent Marking, 1037 PLI/PAT 
269, 272 (2011) (citing Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 
2009)). 
 533. Rydstrom et al., supra note 526, at 1, 3. 
 534. Laurence P. Colton et al., Intellectual Property, 61 MERCER L. REV. 1153, 1155 
(2010). Other criticism lodged against § 292 of the Patent Act focuses not on the Informer’s 
Action it provides, but instead on its inclusion of marking patents which have expired among 
the actionable offenses. See Laura N. Arneson, Note, Defining Unpatented Article: Why 
Labeling Products with Expired Patent Numbers Should Not Be False Marketing, 94 MINN. L. 
REV. 650, 652–53 (2010). 
 535. Colton et al., supra note 534, at 1171. 
 536. Raymond H. Brescia, On Public Plaintiffs and Private Harms: The Standing of 
Municipalities in Climate Change, Firearms, and Financial Crisis Litigation, 24 NOTRE DAME 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 7, 40 n.164 (2010). 
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(f) RIGHT OF WHISTLEBLOWER TO BRING RELATOR’S 
ENFORCEMENT ACTION IN CASES WHERE THE SEC DOES 
NOT PURSUE ENFORCEMENT ACTION. ––Any person who 
has voluntarily provided original information to the 
Commission is permitted, where the Commission declines to 
take enforcement action within 180 days of the provision of 
such information, to pursue a claim for violation of the 
Securities Laws for the person and the Commission. Upon 
filing the action, the person will serve a copy on the 
Commission. The Commission may seek a stay of 
proceedings to continue to investigate whether it will take 
action in the matter. 
 
(1) The Action shall be brought in the name of the 
Commission. The action may be dismissed only if the court 
and the SEC give written consent to the dismissal and their 
reasons for consenting. 
 
(2) When a person brings an action under this subsection, no 
person other than the Commission or other agency of the 
United States Government or a state may intervene or bring 
a related action based on the facts underlying the pending 
action.  
 
(3) The Commission may dismiss the action notwithstanding 
the objections of the person initiating the action if the person 
has been notified by the Commission of the filing of the 
motion, and the court has provided the person with an 
opportunity for a hearing on the motion.  
 
(4) The Commission may settle the action with the 
defendant notwithstanding the objections of the person 
initiating the action if the court determines, after a hearing, 
that the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable 
under all the circumstances. Upon a showing of good cause, 
such hearing may be held in camera. 
 
(5) If the Commission requests it, the action shall be served 
with copies of all pleadings filed in the action and shall be 
supplied with copies of all deposition transcripts (at the 
DO NOT DELETE 2/2/2012 11:58 AM 
73 Mutiny by the Bounties? 
 149 
Commission’s expense). The Court may permit the 
Commission to intervene at a later date upon a showing of 
good cause.  
 
(6) If successful, such person shall be entitled to a payment 
of 10–30% of the total civil sanctions imposed in such 
proceeding, depending on the factors enumerated in 
subsection (c)(1)(B) of this section. No person ineligible for 
a bounty under subsection (c)(2) of this section is eligible to 
bring a Relator’s Enforcement Action under this subsection. 
 
As a quality-control mechanism, the Informer’s Act model 
follows the FCA precedent in giving the government the option to 
seek dismissal of claims it views as meritless. This mechanism should 
reduce the likelihood that the Relator’s Enforcement Action would 
trigger a significant number of frivolous or meritless claims. 
Rather than adopting a sort of fixed-bounty scheme like the one 
in the former provisions of the False Marking Act,537 the proposal 
here would continue to vest authority to assign an appropriate 
sanction to the federal courts. In current SEC actions litigated in 
federal court, “[o]nce a district court has found federal securities 
laws violations, it has ‘broad equitable power to fashion appropriate 
remedies.’”538 Civil penalties are “determined by the court in light of 
the facts and circumstances.”539  
The SEC’s statutory authorization to seek fines limits the 
amount of a fine to the greater of “the gross pecuniary gain” to the 
wrongdoer or a “maximum statutory amount.”540 The maximum 
statutory amount for civil penalties that can be imposed against 
natural persons ranges from $5000 (for first-tier violations), to 
$50,000 (for second-tier violations), to $100,000 (for third-tier 
violations).541 For nonnatural persons (corporations, LLCs, and the 
 
 537. The fixed bounty scheme in the False Marking Act has been criticized for having 
nothing to do with the fairness of damages and the culpability of the wrongdoer. Winston, 
supra note 25, at 115. 
 538. SEC v. CMKM Diamonds, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1189 (D. Nev. 2009) 
(citing SEC v. Haligiannis, 470 F. Supp. 2d 373, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)). There is relatively 
little appellate court guidance on the “scope, target, and amount of civil penalties except to 
confirm the discretionary nature of the remedy.” Black, supra note 136, at 325. 
 539. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)(2)(A) (2006). 
 540. Atkins & Bondi, supra note 249, at 392. 
 541. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)(2)(A)–(C). 
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like), the limits for first-, second-, and third-tier violations are 
$50,000, $250,000, and $500,000 respectively.542 Classification into 
a “tier” is made based on the severity of offense. Tier II penalties 
require “fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless 
disregard of a regulatory requirement,”543 and Tier III penalties 
additionally require that the violation “result[] in substantial losses 
or create[] a significant risk of substantial losses to other persons.”544 
A separate schedule of fines applies to insider trading violations.545 In 
deciding on a fine, courts will consider:  
(1) the egregiousness of the violations at issue[;] (2) defendants’ 
scienter[;] (3) the repeated nature of the violations[;] (4) 
defendants’ failure to admit their wrongdoing; (5) whether 
defendants’ conduct created substantial losses or the risk of 
substantial losses to other persons; (6) defendants’ lack of 
cooperation and honesty with authorities, if any; and (7) whether 
the penalty that would otherwise be appropriate should be reduced 
due to defendants’ demonstrated current and future financial 
condition.546 
Of course, penalties are imposed per violation, so a particular 
scheme to defraud can trigger multiple fines if it involves multiple 
instances of fraudulent communications to shareholders or the 
market.547 Added to the civil penalty is the amount of pecuniary gain 
(if any) enjoyed by a defendant—this raises the fine level, even 
though it also can be used as the basis for an order of disgorgement. 
In practice, the calculation of a particular level of sanction is a 
complicated process. The SEC and “defendants each compare the 
misconduct to that in other cases and argue that the penalty should 
be more or less than in those other cases.”548 This same practice 
could be utilized to calculate fines for Relator Enforcement Actions 
as proposed in this Article. 
 
 542.  Id. 
 543. Id. § 77t(d)(2)(B). 
 544. Id. § 77t(d)(2)(C). 
 545. Id. § 78u-1. 
 546. SEC v. Lybrand, 281 F. Supp. 2d 726, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 547. SEC v. Haligiannis, 470 F. Supp. 2d 373, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that 
“[e]ach of the quarterly statements sent to each of the investors” constitutes a separate 
violation). 
 548. Arthur B. Laby & W. Hardy Callcott, Patterns of SEC Enforcement Under the 1990 
Remedies Act: Civil Money Penalties, 58 ALB. L. REV. 5, 50 (1994). 
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The creation of this Relator’s Enforcement Action might reduce 
the need for the SEC to consider awarding bounties in low- or no-
sanction actions as provided in the first proposed reform of Dodd-
Frank suggested above.549 Currently, resource limitations may lead 
the SEC to adopt a softer approach to target companies by accepting 
resolution of enforcement actions involving little (or no) monetary 
sanction except in the most serious of cases. Low-level sanctions may 
result not from any substantive determination that the fraud is not 
serious, but instead from the SEC’s recognition that a particular case 
would require a relatively unwise expenditure of governmental 
resources. Were the Informer’s Act model adopted, the SEC might 
be inspired to decline to involve itself at all in those difficult, but 
likely low-reward cases. As a result, individual whistleblowers would 
be empowered to bring a greater share of the potential enforcement 
actions, in which they would enjoy the potential for bounties 
provided. An ancillary advantage of freeing the SEC from pursuing 
investigations likely to lead to low-level enforcement awards would 
be that its resources could be redirected toward “big-ticket” cases. 
The proposed Relator’s Enforcement Action structure offers 
several advantages. First, it is likely to expand the scope of deterrence 
of securities fraud. Under the current system, the SEC brings 
relatively few actions but seeks significant fines.550 Research on the 
effectiveness of sanctions indicates that milder punishments more 
consistently applied have a greater deterrent effect than do harsher 
but less certain sanctions.551 Second, since informers would be 
bringing claims in the name of the government, they would not face 
some of the difficult burdens imposed on private plaintiffs in Rule 
10b-5 actions.552 Third, and most importantly, the Relator’s 
Enforcement Action will prevent the SEC from continuing to 
function as a roadblock to leveraging whistleblower information for 
the enforcement of the securities laws. 
 
 549. The Informer’s Act model also reduces the need for any statutory minimum level of 
sanctions to trigger bounties. If the justification for such floors is a concern about frivolous 
claims, that concern can be addressed in an Informer’s Act model since there will be little 
financial benefit to whistleblowers and lawyers associated with bringing extremely low-payoff 
claims. 
 550. Laby & Callcott, supra note 548, at 51. 
 551. Id. at 51 & n.306. 
 552. Black, supra note 136, at 335. These barriers include the requirements that private 
plaintiffs are purchasers or sellers who suffered a loss as a result of the misrepresentation. In 
some cases, private securities plaintiffs must also establish reliance. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
We have certainly come a long way from the days in which 
would-be whistleblowers, like Enron’s Sherron Watkins, in financial 
fraud cases had no protection under federal or state law from being 
terminated for objecting to fraudulent financial practices. A decade 
ago, federal law created a uniform protection for such tipsters. 
Inconsistent enforcement has hampered that statute’s effectiveness. 
But the significant economic troubles of the past few years, along 
with the exposure of some massive fraudulent schemes, have 
renewed interest in the role of financial fraud whistleblowers. 
Dodd-Frank’s bounty scheme is a major shift in the direction of 
recognizing the role that monetary incentives can play in stimulating 
whistleblowers to face the tremendous personal, social, and 
economic costs of bringing fraud to light. However, although we 
have been given a good start, we cannot say mission accomplished. 
Dodd-Frank’s limitation to those rare SEC actions producing seven-
figure enforcement sanctions means that for the vast majority of 
whistleblowers the promise of a bounty will remain an illusion. More 
importantly, the absence of a vehicle by which whistleblowers 
themselves can pursue financial fraud claims means that nothing will 
be done to strengthen the nonmonetary incentives that lead people 
to expose fraud. 
This Article has proposed two fixes to Dodd-Frank: one would 
allow the payment of bounties even in cases producing nonmonetary 
sanctions, and the other would empower whistleblowers to pursue 
financial fraudsters even if the SEC remains inactive. So far, 
legislators have shown more interest in creating even more holes in 
Dodd-Frank than filling in the ones already present in the statute. 
Wall Street may have to collapse in another bubble a decade from 
now before policymakers finally get around to adopting a more 
straightforward and effective whistleblower reward program. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
